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Thesis

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

by
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(B.S. in J., Boston University, 1943)
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requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
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"And it will always happen that the one who is not your friend will want you to remain neutral, and the one who is your friend will require you to declare yourself by taking arms. Irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, usually follow the way of neutrality and are mostly ruined by it."

- Niccolo Machiavelli

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INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 1947, in recommending that Congress authorize \$400,000,000 in direct economic and indirect military aid to Greece and Turkey, President Truman said:

"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."¹

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, explaining the President's recommendation that we take over British commitments in the eastern Mediterranean, revealed before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 20, that the Security Council of the United Nations was investigating Greek charges that Communist-led armed bands in the north of Greece were partly supplied and trained by neighboring countries. On that occasion, Acheson stated:

"In the event of economic collapse and government paralysis, these bands would undoubtedly increase in strength until they took over Greece and instituted a totalitarian government similar to those prevailing in countries to the north of Greece. The rule of an armed minority would fasten itself upon the people of Greece."²

Ten years ago, the peace-loving advocates of constitutional government throughout the world silently watched, at the opposite end of the Mediterranean, the pitiable spec-

1. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVI, No. 403, p. 536.

2. Ibid., No. 404, p. 581.

tacle of a five-year-old Republic struggling unattended in the awful throes of violent death. In July of 1936, the combined forces of reaction had struck a formidable blow in Spain, and for three years a nightmare of terror and counter-terror stalked that unhappy land.

Today - the Greek Government has charged the totalitarian states of the Left with training and supplying Communist bands of guerillas seeking to overthrow that Government. Ten years ago, the Government of Spain charged before the Council of the League of Nations that the totalitarian states of the Right were supplying the Spanish Insurgents with troops, planes, arms, and munitions.

As the civil strife continued in Spain, and as the gravity of the situation increased, the legitimate Government of that country appealed to non-interventionist Great Britain- to non-interventionist France--and to isolationist America for permission to purchase- in exchange for gold - the most desperately needed means with which to defend itself. But the United States had been drawn into the camp of the appeasers, and aid for constitutional governments was not forthcoming in 1937. The "rule of an armed minority" was destined to "fasten itself upon the people" of Spain.

Strict "neutrality" was the rule in our policy toward the Spanish conflict of 1936-1939. We were having yet another try at non-intervention. Five months after General Franco's victory, the most fearful holocaust in the

history of man was to consume civilizations in every corner of the globe. History could record yet another failure for non-intervention.

When, on May 9, the House of Representatives passed by a vote of 287-107 the bill which would advance the recommended aid to Greece and Turkey, the American people and the people of all other nations were served with further notice that we are about to begin a new chapter in American foreign policy--the chapter of interventionism.

In 1513, Niccolo Machiavelli offered the following advice to princes seeking success in foreign relations:

" . . . one ought never to allow a disorder to take place in order to avoid war, for war is not thereby avoided, but only deferred to your disadvantage."¹

If the community of nations had not allowed the disorder in Spain to take place, would humanity have been spared the appalling destruction--the "blood, sweat, and tears" of the world tragedy of 1939-1945? Would we have been spared the sorrow and the suffering of today? Would we have been spared the misery which is sure to be the lot of countless millions tomorrow?

This thesis seeks the answers to the following questions: "Could we have shed our scales of isolationism ten years ago? Should we have done so in our Spanish policy? Did we, in Spain, merely join the western democracies in quaran-

1. N. Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses, Modern Library, Random House, N. Y., 1940. p. 14.

tinuing an arena--an arena in which the counter-monster of Fascism was ripping the guts from the monster of Bolshevism? Or was Spain in 1936-1939 something more? Was it the cross-roads for the League of Nations, for Britain, for France, for the United States--for all freely elected governments?"

Sumner Welles has said of our attitude toward the situation in Spain:

"In the long history of the foreign policy of the Roosevelt Administration, there has been, I think, no more cardinal error than the policy adopted during the civil war in Spain."¹

If we had a definite Spanish policy, who or what forces decided the path to be trod?

The study undertaken here has been primarily concerned with the official stand adopted by this Government in regard to the Spanish Civil War. Our Spanish policy raised a controversy throughout the United States seldom equalled in bitterness or partisanship. The widely divergent sympathies expressed in the press and in private conversation, the equally great difference of opinion voiced from the platform and from the pulpit, would seem to more than justify an inquiry into this problem.

Charles A. Beard has said that official foreign policy, in democracies as well as in dictatorships, is always conducted by a few persons.² This investigation has made it

1. S. Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 61.

2. C. A. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, p. 5.

quite evident that, even though foreign policy in a democracy is conducted by a few persons, the attitude of the United States toward Spain in 1936-1939 was decided by policy-makers who were influenced, to no small degree, by public opinion and by well-organized pressure groups.

But, neither our Spanish policy nor that pressure from the Right which sought to maintain the status quo or strict "non-intervention," or that pressure from the Left which sought to repeal the Spanish embargo, can be clearly understood or fully appreciated without first examining carefully the issues in Spain. What were the real issues in Spain? What was the true nature of the political, social, economic, and religious institutions of that country? What factors in Spanish history made the Revolution of 1931 and the counter-Revolution of 1936 inevitable?

In order to organize more effectively the material presented in this study, the thesis has been written in ^{two} ~~three~~ parts. Part I deals with the background in Spain, with the political aspects and international repercussions of the Civil War itself, and with the attitude adopted by the League of Nations, by the western democracies, and by the totalitarian states.

In Part II, which concerns the policy of the United States toward the conflict, we find the core of the problem. Although some space has been devoted to a preliminary consideration of the traditions and innovations in American neut-

ality prior to the passage of the arms embargo against the Spanish Republic, more detailed consideration has been given to United States- Spanish relations during the first six months of the rebellion, to the story behind the Spanish embargo, and to the fierce and determined struggle over our official policy which raged within and outside the Government.

An attempt has been made, in Part II, to follow the Spanish question from General Franco's victory through World War II, and into this, the post-war world, in order to analyze better the consequences of the appeasement and isolationist policies of the democracies.

The purpose of this thesis has been to review one of the most controversial and most critical periods in the recent history of American foreign policy, and to draw attention to the many defects and often fatal weaknesses of democracy in the field of foreign relations. We can no longer afford the luxury of having a foreign policy dictated by states within our State, if we are to put the interests of the country as a whole ahead of the interests of special groups. Those who conduct our foreign policy, those who decide our foreign policy, and those who influence the decisions of the policy-makers cannot afford to ignore the moral lessons as well as the lessons in realistic, practical world politics which have been learned at such terrible cost during the decade of disaster since the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.

James Vance Elliott

PART I

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR--
PRELUDE TO WORLD DISASTER

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT: THE ROAD OF REVOLUTION

On April 14, 1931, Alfonso XIII was forced to abdicate as King of the Spaniards, and in a bloodless revolution the Republic of Spain was proclaimed. But the overthrow of the Spanish Monarchy, the climax to the long struggle between Republicans and Monarchists, was not the end but the beginning of a revolution in Spain. Where the political revolution was to end, a social, an economic, and, in a sense, religious revolution was to begin.

Revolutions do not just happen, and political scientists since Aristotle, well aware of the fact, have repeatedly warned governments that wherever pre-conditions for change by force exist, there will always be the grave threat of change by force. The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to consider the national character of the Spaniard, as well as to review the history of Spanish political, economic, social, and religious institutions in an attempt to uncover some of the reasons for the upheaval of 1931 which precipitated the tragedy of 1936.

A. Psychology of the Spaniard

"And revolutions will be most likely to happen, and must happen, when the mass of people are of the high-spirited kind, and have a notion that they are as good as their rulers."

- Aristotle¹

1. Politics, New York: Modern Library, 1943. p. 226.

That Spaniards are, on the whole, an intensely individualistic and highly emotional people, there seems to be little room for doubt. Once individualism is recognized as a trait inherent in the Spanish national character, the strong tendency of the Spaniard towards anarchy and separatism becomes the more easily understood. And once Spanish emotionalism, the rule of the heart over the head, is taken into consideration, other Europeans and Americans will not attribute the commission of many violent crimes in Spain to an unusually cruel or vindictive streak in the people of that country.

Although a lack of control over emotional temperament is a good explanation for the almost complete absence of a national discipline in Spain, Lawrence A. Fernsworth says that the Spaniard is undisciplined because he is driven--that when persuaded he is quite willing to accept what he considers a proper and reasonable discipline.¹

To Gerald Brennan, the Spaniards seem to be by nature a suspicious and exclusive people who live in small compartments and like to settle their affairs through small groups, a people who give everything for their family, their friends, their dependants, their class, but nothing for outsiders.²

In commenting upon their native intelligence, Chapman says that, generally speaking, the Spaniards are brilliantly intellectual, that even the man in the street often seems

1. Foreign Affairs, July, 1936, p. 666.

2. "The Spanish Labyrinth," p. 4.

to have a faculty for seeing and expressing things quite clearly with little or no study. However, a lack of intellectual stamina, Chapman maintains, accounts for the fact that big business and scientific discoveries have been left to foreigners.¹

The contempt for work which has been characteristic of the upper classes in Spain might help to explain why foreigners have taken the lead in business and science on the Iberian Peninsula. Brennan believes that this trait, along with Spanish pride and impatience, may be attributed to the fact that Spain came too quickly, without adequate economic or cultural preparation, into her heritage of Empire.²

The psychology of the Spaniard has had tremendously important effects upon the development of political institutions and political trends in Spain. E. A. Peers, in the following passages, presents a somewhat pessimistic view of the immediate chances of democracy in that country:

"The Spaniards, taken all round, are not so democratically inclined as most other nations of western Europe, nor are they as progressive a people as some of their intellectuals would like them, and us to believe. . . . But we need not fall into that error in order to appreciate the fact that the Spaniards are a great deal more democratic and progressive than their immediate ancestors could have foreseen that they would be."³

.....
 "The Spaniards, on the other hand, have a passion for individualism, and when they attempt

1. "History of Spain," p. 519.

2. Ibid., p. 11.

3. "The Spanish Tragedy, 1930-1936," p. 3.

to co-operate do so badly or fail altogether. Till they change their nature, as with the changing conditions of European life they may gradually do in the course of centuries, it is idle to suppose them capable of Federal government, and for that reason, their warmest well-wishers trust that they will never be led into experimenting with it."¹

But, as Fernsworth has pointed out, the same Spanish individualism which has stood in the way of cooperation in a democratic society, has also proved to be a strong obstacle to the spread of the Soviet brand of collectivism in which the individual is submerged in the state.²

Spanish anarchy, then, has stood in the way of both democratic cooperation and totalitarian collectivism. This all-important trait in the psychology of the country will be considered in greater detail in that part of this chapter which deals with the labor movement in Spain.

B. Forces Shaping the Destiny of Spain

1. Separatism

The marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabel of Castille in 1469 marks the beginning of modern Spain. This reign, says Salvador de Madariaga, was symbolic of the forces which have been at work in Spanish history--the forces of individualism, state consciousness, universalism; of anarchy, politics, religion; of the individual, the state, the church.³ When the House of Aragon and the House of Castille became one,

1. Ibid., p. 116.

3. "Spain," p. 27.

2. Ibid., p. 665.

Spanish anarchy became the State of the Machiavellian Ferdinand and the Spanish State became the Church of the devout Isabel.¹

But when the strong tendency towards individualism--which remained a predominant trait of the Spanish national character--was stimulated by the harsh centralizing policies of the Bourbons and the Liberals during the 19th century, the memory of past freedoms and independence was destined to confront the authorities in Madrid with three separatist or home-rule movements. In explaining these nationalist movements, de Madariaga says:

"Much of the uncompromising and intransigent character of these home-rule problems, their tendency to separatism, far from being justified by their more or less solid arguments as 'differences,' turn out to be the outcome of an identity of character between Catalans, Basques, and other Spaniards. The more separatist a Catalan or a Basque is the more Spanish he reveals himself to be. Just as the Anarcho-Syndicalist is a separatist from the Socialist, and the Right from the Left, and the Church from progress, and the army from the people, and everything from everything else in Spanish political life, so the Catalans and the Basques tend towards separatism from the rest of Spain."²

Language was the basis for the Catalan separatist movement just as it was the basis for the home-rule agitation in the Basque Provinces and in Galicia, where Gallegan is a language much closer to Portuguese than to Castilian.

Catalonia, originally an extension of the south of France in both a linguistic and cultural sense,³ was one of

1. "Spain," p. 28.

2. Ibid., p. 184.

3. Brenan, "The Spanish Labyrinth," p. 25.

the first Roman possessions in Spain. It was occupied by the Goths in 470, conquered by the Moors in 712, and later ruled as a Mark by French counts, until one of them rebelled against the French king in 809, and started Catalonia on her career of independence.

In 1162, Catalonia and Aragon were united under Alfonso II of Aragon. During this union which lasted until 1410, Catalonia was the leading member of the confederation. Brennan comments on Catalonia during this period:

" . . . under the rich merchant class which ruled it during the Middle Ages, it acquired an active, enterprising character and a European outlook very different from its semi-pastoral neighbors on the interior plateau. . . ."¹

The modern Catalan movement began between 1822-45, when the Bourbons and Liberals, determined to make the central authority supreme, deprived the Catalans of their liberties, penal and commercial laws, their special tribunals, and their right to use their language in the schools.² The importance of the political repercussions in Spain caused by the revival of Catalan national feeling is stressed by Brennan:

" . . . For more than twenty years it poisoned the political atmosphere in Spain much as the Irish question had poisoned that in England--with the difference, however, that Catalonia is not a backward and impoverished island, but the chief industrial district of the Peninsula. . . . Again in 1873, during the brief rule of the Federal Republic, all except one of the cities of the south-east from Seville to Valencia remembered their origins as Mediterranean city-

1. Ibid., p. 25. 2. Brennan, op. cit., p. 27; de Madariaga, op. cit., p. 167.

states and declared themselves free ports and independent cantons, acknowledging no central authority."¹

The two most important forces constituting the strength of the separatist movement in the Basque Provinces are religious fanaticism and a stubborn tradition of local rights. De Madariaga says that although the linguistic claims of the Basque Nationalists are always a convenient excuse by which to justify their separatist ambitions, experts, by classifying 25 different Basque dialects, have disproved the argument that a true Basque language exists. The historical roots of Basque nationalism, this author maintains, may be found in Carlism.²

2. Carlism

Carlism was born of a dynastic dispute. While Spanish law permitted women to inherit the throne, the Salic Law brought to Spain by the Bourbons in 1714, but never recognized, barred females from that inheritance. When Ferdinand VII died without leaving a male heir, Don Carlos, his brother, based his claim to rule on the Salic Law. But Queen Dona Maria Cristina, with the support of the Liberals, had her daughter Isabel crowned at the death of her husband, and had herself named as regent.

But religious and political questions were even more responsible for the cruelty and wanton destructiveness which

1. Ibid., p. 24.

2. Ibid., p. 179.

characterized the bitter Carlist-Liberal struggles than were dynastic issues. The conviction that Liberalism was but a second wave of the old Lutheran heresy made the Carlists more fanatical than did their belief in the cause of Don Carlos.¹ When the peasants in the Basque Provinces of the north saw that the Liberals planned to continue the centralizing policies of the Bourbon kings, their strong and fierce individualistic tendencies led them to rally to the support of the Carlists during the first Carlist War from 1833-40, and again between 1870-76 when the Carlists, supported by monks and priests, were to raid, plunder, and lay waste the country in an orgy of anarchy, terror, and counter-terror.

De Madariaga says of the aim of this very disturbing force in Spanish history:

"During the nineteenth century the chief strongholds of Carlism were the Catalan countryside and the high, narrow valleys of Biscay and Guipuzcoa. Carlism was, of course, a much deeper movement than a mere dynastic dispute. The Carlists represented the forces of religious and political authority against the liberals, whose stronghold was Madrid backed by a few Andalusian towns. . . . Carlism was concerned with keeping the whole of Spain under the undisputed authority of king and priest."²

3. Militarism

The position of the Army in the political life of Spain before 1931 might be compared with that of the Japanese Army before the outbreak of World War II. The officers in

1. Brennan, op. cit., p. 205.

2. Ibid., p. 181.

the Spanish Army drew their authority directly from the king and in more than one sense represented him. Their economic privileges and other exceptional rights made them a privileged class, a group which considered itself and was considered by others to be above the law. In 1905, the Law of Jurisdictions greatly increased the political power of the military. This law, by making attacks on officers or military institutions offenses to be tried before military courts, gave the Army authority over any action or criticism which might be interpreted as being hostile to either the king or the regime.

The following paragraph presents de Madariaga's view of Spanish militarism:

"Militarism is hardly a correct word in the case of Spain. It is used here only in order to conform with the traditional misuse of it. The evil in Spain is praetorianism. . . . a body of officers, by no means a caste, controls the political life of the nation, giving but little thought to foreign affairs and intent on the preservation of power and on the administration and enjoyment of a disproportionate amount of the Budget."¹

The 19th century transformation of the Army from a force in favor of liberalism to a power bolstering the cause of reaction in Spain is explained by the same writer:

"It has been shrewdly said that the intermittent civil war of the 19th century may be interpreted as a struggle for supremacy between the army and the Church, ending in a compromise. This would explain the army's change of front, during the Restoration, from its liberalism of old to its present reactionary attitude. . . The Church was no longer a rival to the army, for the Church in Spain, though a strong prop of the structure, would collapse with it if it went. . ."²

1. Ibid., p. 136.

2. Ibid., p. 137.

Paradoxically enough, the Army did enter Spanish politics at the call of Spain's Liberals.

In 1812, after Napoleon had been driven from Spain by the British and by Spanish guerillas, a Cortes, controlled by the Liberals, met at Cadiz, and Spain was given a constitution. But when the Liberals were unable to count on popular support, they enlisted the aid of the military leader, Riego, who governed constitutionally until 1823, when France, fulfilling her pledge given at the Congress of Troppau three years earlier to restore legitimate governments overthrown by revolution, invaded Spain and put the craven Ferdinand VII back upon the throne.

Riego was but the first of Spain's military politicians. During the reign of Queen Isabel, five militarists were to dominate the political scene. Espartero was regent until 1843 and Narvaez became prime minister in 1844. O'Donnell was to carry on the tradition, followed by Serrano and Prim. In 1868, when the Army and Navy revolted and Isabel had fled the country, Serrano became head of the Provisional Government assisted by Prim.

In February of 1873, the Cortes voted for a Republic. But, after a brief period of chaos which saw Spain with four Presidents in less than a year, and two Cortes dissolved, Serrano once again ruled as a military dictator until, on December 29, 1874, a brigade of soldiers proclaimed Isabel's son as Alfonso XII of Spain.¹ With the Restoration came the

1. de Madariaga, op. cit., p. 64.

alliance of Army with Church against the people.

Spain was to be ruled by her most colorful dictator, and her last military policeman before Franco, after the rebellion of the Army on September 13, 1923. On that date, General Primo de Rivera, an Andalusian landowner and captain-general from Catalonia, announced that he had come to rule for a period of 90 days during which the nation would be prepared for democratic government.¹

De Madariaga gives, as reasons for Rivera's seizure of power, the grave state of Moroccan affairs, the political instability of the period and the collapse of successive governments, and the conviction of Alfonso XIII that since neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals were capable of carrying on the government, dictatorship was the only solution.² More attention will be paid to the Rivera dictatorship in another part of this chapter.

4. Clericalism

Clericalism was a great economic, a great political, and a great spiritual power in Spain. De Madariaga attributes the source of clerical strength to the fact that the Church has been an institution among a people whose fanatical love of liberty prevented the natural development of other institutions which otherwise might have shared influence and power with Catholicism.

1. Peers, "The Spanish Tragedy, 1930-1936," p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 251.

The clerical tendencies of the Crown were due to the tradition which entrusted the education of the heir to clerical men, while clericalism as a force influencing the middle class in Spain can be explained by the realization that, although only a minority of middle-class Spaniards are devoutly Catholic, most of the members of this minority are clericals, and move actively in the universities, in the field of law, and in government circles, freely mixing their religion with their politics.¹

Even though it was in the field of education that its efforts were greatest, the clerical faction admitted its inability to educate the masses of the Spanish people. Nevertheless, the religious orders vigorously opposed all lay efforts in that direction. De Madariaga, in voicing the opinion that clerical education is bad by any standard, states that the Church schools have always sought to escape objective examinations, and that instead of discouraging superstition they encourage it.² The author of "Spain" cites the report of a leading expert on the educational question in which it was calculated that as late as 1923, 50 percent were being educated by the State and 25 percent being educated by the Church.³ In 1936, it was estimated that the illiteracy rate among agricultural workers in some sections of Spain was as high as 85 percent.⁴

1. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 133.

2. Ibid., p. 136.

3. Ibid., p. 131.

4. Foreign Policy Reports, Jan. 1, 1937, p. 247.

Clericalism has been as great a disturbing force in the political development of Spain as has been militarism, according to what de Madariaga has to say in the paragraph below:

"The history of the nineteenth century in Spain would have been much quieter and richer in results had the evolution of the Spanish people taken place in the absence of clericalism and militarism. As it is, the almost chronic civil war, the outward form of that evolution in the nineteenth century, though beginning as a conflict between absolutism and liberalism, gradually degenerates into a conflict between clericalism and militarism and, what is worse, ends in a tacit but efficient treaty of peace and cooperation between the two, so that the arms of the Restoration might well be described as a sword and a cross (considered as a weapon) surmounted by the royal crown."¹

Perhaps the most easily explained reasons for the strong anti-clerical feeling which, throughout the history of modern Spain, has erupted in periodic outbursts of terrible passion are economic. Religious orders in Spain have been among the greatest economic powers in that country. They have operated clothing factories, flour mills, and laundries in competition with private industry, paying no taxes and using the unpaid labor of students and their own members. So great was the industrial and commercial activity of these religious orders that, in 1931, it was estimated in the Cortes that the Jesuits owned a third of the nation's wealth.²

In commenting upon this materialism and pursuit of economic activity of the part of the Jesuits and other orders,

1. Ibid., p. 127.

2. "Background of the War II: The Struggle in Spain," Fortune, April, 1937, p. 85.

de Madariaga warns that:

"Orders which amass wealth and try to influence social life by providing clothes, education or other advantages in exchange for religious liberty do so at their own risk."¹

Clericalism will be further considered as a precondition for revolution in that section of this chapter devoted to the Church in Spain.

C. The Church

At the dawn of modern history in Spain, the Church of Juan de Mariana and Francisco Suarez, in spite of its independent attitude towards Rome, was neither an ally nor a submissive instrument of the State. Although it sided with the king against the Pope, through such spokesmen as Mariana, the Spanish Church championed the cause of the people against tyrannical kings.

Spanish Catholicism in the 16th century was a force responsible for enriching the world in spirituality, in culture, and in art. During the Counter-Reformation Spain was the chief factor in the reformation and purification of the Church from within.²

What happened to the Church in Spain during the centuries between the Counter-Reformation and the Revolution of 1931? What could possibly explain the corrosive hate which gnawed at the heart and brain of millions of Spanish Catholics

1. Ibid., p. 133.

2. de Madariaga, op. cit., p. 32.

until terrible floods of violence were periodically unleashed, and stemmed only after the wholesale burning of churches and slaying of priests? De Madariaga attempts to supply an answer to these questions by saying:

"Those persons who prefer rationalistic explanations may note that the Spanish Church was great while it lived on the great universities of the sixteenth century, and that its decadence followed that of the celebrated seats of learning. Ignorant and stubborn monks led the resistance to progressive measures during the nineteenth century."¹

". . . The Church had sadly neglected its chief duty in Spain. No institution in any country had at its disposal assets as splendid as those the Catholic Church had in Spain to keep its hold on the people, for Spanish Catholic culture is exceptionally rich in all that which most easily touches the soul, and particularly the Spanish soul. . . . What use had the Church made of this spiritual treasure? None whatever. . . . This was the worst crime of the Spanish Church, for it has let the spirit of the Spanish people lie fallow, ready for other seeds. . . . Always on the side of the powerful, the rich, the oppressive authority, the priest had to become the object of general aversion."²

From the Restoration of 1874 to the Revolution of 1931, the Church, though steadily losing its influence with the poor, was gaining in wealth and in political power. In exchange for gifts, the Church was expected to defend the interests of the rich against the poor.³ In the words of Brennan:

"So that one must say that the year 1912 marks the end of the long struggle between the Church and the Liberal parties. The Church was

1. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 377.

3. Brennan, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

drawing closer to the Army and to the Crown and was seeking in them a means to its complete triumph. It had made its choice between the poor and the rich and there was no turning back. It did not of course wish to. The rich would provide it with the money needed to win over the poor and in return it would guarantee 'social respect and order.' That was the policy. Unfortunately the bargain did not correspond to the real circumstances or to the state of opinion in the country and there was no possibility of its being carried out."¹

Much of the loss of religious faith in Spain can be blamed on the militant attitude of the Spanish hierarchy, who, down to the 20th century, believed in destroying their enemies. Another reason for the hostility of the working classes towards the Church is the success of the propaganda of the anarchists who consider the priests and the monks as deceivers who have betrayed the people and gone over to the side of the rich.

The great political power of the Church and its close alliance with the State can explain a considerable portion of the hatred felt by the masses for the hierarchy, the clergy, and the orders in Spain. Before 1931, civil law and canonical law existed side by side. Since the bishops were nominated by the king, and the hierarchy and the clergy were paid from the public treasury, the bishops and priests shared political power with secular officers, some of the bishops even sitting in the Senate. Hence, it was only natural to expect that when political power was oppressive and corrupt, the wrath of the people should fall on ecclesiastic and layman alike.

1. Ibid., p. 55.

As an economic power, the Church was even more powerful. Although during the 19th century it had lost its great holdings of land, the Church received in lieu of the income from its vast estates an annual subsidy which in 1931 amounted to the sum of \$12,000,000. This subsidy was supplemented annually by fees for masses, baptisms, marriages, and burials as well as by gifts and alms.¹

Lawrence A. Fernsworth reporting on the heavy drain which the Church constituted on the economic resources of Spain stated:

"It was topheavy with clergy--sixteen to twenty of them could be seen any day at some modest funeral, each one collecting his fee. And how many times have I walked into some cathedral to find a solemn or a pontifical mass being celebrated in all liturgical pomp with the assistance of the entire cathedral chapter and in the presence of only three or four of the faithful."²

Despite his strong anti-clerical sentiments, the Spaniard is, to de Madariaga, a profoundly religious person with a religion of his own which for all practical purposes coincides with Catholicism.³ Clericalism, says this writer, is a diseased growth along the lines of the healthy development of Catholic societies, and for this reason it is almost impossible to attack clerical abuses without seeming to attack Catholic institutions.⁴

1. "Background of the WAR II: The Struggle in Spain," loc. cit., p. 86.

2. Foreign Affairs, October 1936, p. 97.

3. Ibid., p. 133.

4. Ibid., p. 128.

The strong intolerance of the Catholic Church in Spain which has sought to prevent all development of independent thought in that country has been combined with an aggressive attitude and a self-assertion which could hardly be considered as Christian. The only hope for reform, in the opinion of de Madariaga, is in a movement within the Church itself by which its overzealous activities for the education of the people may be turned inwards. The Spanish Church, he says, stands in urgent need of self-education.¹

D. The Agrarian Problem

"Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution. . . ." - Aristotle²

"Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much and others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme. . . ." - Aristotle³

Political scientists through the ages have restated and elaborated upon Aristotle's views on the economic basis of revolution. Of those later thinkers who devoted particular attention to the agrarian problem, James Harrington, whose "Oceana" was addressed to Oliver Cromwell in 1656, was one whose statements might well be noted. In advancing his theory that all Commonwealths must inevitably fall unless they possess the solid foundation of an equal agrarian, Harrington said:

1. Ibid., p. 136.

2. ~~"Background of the War II: The Struggle in Spain,"~~
~~loc. cit.~~, p. 211.

3. Ibid., p. 192.

"An equal agrarian is a perpetual law, establishing and preserving the balance of dominion by such a distribution, that no one man or number of men, within the compass of the few or aristocracy, can come to overpower the whole people by their possessions in land."¹

Rome had an unequal agrarian, and this, according to Harrington's following statement, was one of the principal reasons for the fall of that Republic:

". . . by the time of Tiberius Gracchus, the nobility had almost eaten the people quite out of their lands, which they held in the occupation of tenants and servants, whereupon the remedy being too late, and too vehemently applied, that Commonwealth was ruined."²

The failure of the government to solve the agrarian problem in Spain was one of the major causes of all the social unrest and revolutionary action which has rocked that country since the beginning of the 19th century. It cannot be denied that Spain's political difficulties were due, for the most part, to her economic ills--to the poverty of the masses of her people.

Spain is basically an agricultural country. Of her total area of approximately 125 million acres, from 50 to 60 million are cultivated and from 50 to 60 million are used for pasture and underwood, while less than 15 million acres are either totally sterile or are industrial areas. Nevertheless, despite the fact that nearly one-half the total area of Spain is cultivated, the soil of most of these lands is very poor.³

1. "Oceana," in "Ideal Commonwealths," ed. Morley, J., p. 205.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 209.
 3. de Madariaga, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

The problem of remedying the evils of unequal ownership of land has always been the major one confronting governments which have sought the answer to their agrarian question. According to a study made by the Institute of Agrarian Reform, created by the Cortes to administer the Agrarian Law of 1932, it was discovered that of 800,000 rural families, 350,000 owned no land, and 100,000 owned barely enough to make a living.¹

The Property Department, in December of 1930, had arrived at statistics which showed that 957,655 acres were owned by 14 landlords; that in the central southern region of Spain, out of 38,782,040 acres, 15,971, 102 acres were the property of 7,266 great landowners, and the remainder was divided among a million peasants. Throughout Spain, 14,721 landed proprietors owned 27,671,750 acres, while 1,755, 305 people owned the remaining 28,415,975 acres, with the vast majority of these owning two and one-half acres each. In 1936, the Duke of Mendinaceli owned 195,680 acres of land; the Duke of Penaranda 104,345 acres; and the Duke of Alba, according to J. Alvarez del Vayo, 89,625 acres,² but according to Frederick T. Birchall--222,000 acres.³

The impossible situation of this unequal agrarian was aggravated by the fact that there was no law which would limit the liberty of the big landlord to cultivate his vast estates or not as he saw fit. Quite often he would devote a

1. Foreign Policy Reports, Jan. 1, 1937, p. 247.

2. "Freedom's Battle," p. 143.

3. New York Times, June 28, 1936, p. E-5.

few acres for cultivation while reserving the remainder for raising bulls or for hunting.¹

Another factor which made the agrarian problem in Spain even worse was that of absentee landlordism. Many of the owners of great estates lived in Paris, on the Riviera, in the Swiss Alps, or, like the Duke of Alba, spent the best part of their lives in London. Birchall says that such absenteeism makes the evil of great landholding in the 19th and 20th century worse than it was in the days of patriarchal feudalism when the landlord lived on his estate among his people, and looked out for their welfare.²

The exploitation of large estates through the system of tenant-farming permitted the big landowner to arrange the terms of the lease to suit himself, to increase the rent arbitrarily or evict the tenant whenever he so desired.³ De Madariaga gives the following account of the living conditions of the terribly poor:

"The existence of a vast agricultural population which the governing classes had proved unable to save from misery was perhaps the most serious evil in Spanish life. It was an economic evil, for it is evident that the wealth of the country would benefit by a more adequate relationship between the land and its tillers, and that, through land reform, Spain would certainly succeed in raising her food supply and a substantial surplus for export at export prices.

"It was a social and political evil owing to the social ferments which it developed in the mass of agricultural labourers. Ill-fed, ill-

1. de Madariaga, op. cit., p. 114. 2. New York Times,
loc. cit. 3. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 113.

clothed, lacking in instruction, with no stake in the land, the best of them combed out by emigration, the agricultural labourers of Andalusia in particular were a ready ground for all the forms of violent propaganda. . . . Observers of Spanish political life are well aware of the curious relationship between the active anarchist ferment which is endemic in Barcelona and the passive anarchist attitude which lies in waiting in the Andalusian fields. This attitude was fostered by some unwise landlords and estate managers, too overbearing and stupid to read the signs of the times; but worse still, it was fostered by the Government itself. . . .¹

Many small farmers and landless agricultural workers had an annual income inadequate to provide them with but the barest necessities of life. The official records of the province of Avila show that, during the last years of the monarchy, out of 13,530 land tax-payers, 11,452 had a daily income of less than one peseta (about 12 cents in 1936), and 1,758 earned less than five pesetas per day. In what, to de Madariaga, seems a fairly representative Spanish province, 91 percent of the landowners earned less than an average industrial worker. Out of 1,026,412 landowners paying a tax, 1,007,616 had incomes of less than eight pesetas per day, while 847,548 had a daily income of less than one peseta.²

The Institute of Agrarian Reform estimated in 1932 that the normal yearly income of laborers on estates in southern Spain was from 700 to 900 pesetas per year, while annual expenses, at the barest minimum, equalled 2,000 pesetas.³

1. Ibid., p. 115.

2. Ibid., p. 113.

3. Foreign Policy Reports, Jan. 1, 1937, p. 247.

Spain, then, was confronted not only by the problem of unequal agrarian, but by the correlative problem of dreadful poverty. Aristotle has said of the effects of such misery on behavior:

"But he. . . on the other hand who is very poor, or very weak, or very much disgraced, finds it difficult to follow rational principles."¹

The half-starved agricultural workers who have sacked convents and burned churches in Spain could scarcely have been following rational principles. Exploitation, oppression, and hunger, when added to the Spaniard's inherent tendency towards anarchy and emotionalism, could hardly promise stability and success to that government which failed to solve the agrarian question in Spain.

E. The Labor Movement

The labor movement which developed in Spain during the latter half of the 19th century began with the granting of the Constitution of 1876, the constitution which was to last until 1923. When Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin parted company and split the European labor movement wide open in 1879, the more pessimistic socialism of Madrid became quickly nationalized, became institutionalized, and pursued the means of political action to gain its ends. But, in Barcelona, the anarchism which had sprung from the effect of Jean Jacques Rousseau's optimism upon the unrestrained individualism of

1. Ibid., p. 190.

the Catalan, and inspired by the teachings of Bakunin, resulted in a labor movement of fitful and violent agitations and the pursuit of the means of direct action.¹

Brenan describes the effects of Bakunin's teachings upon the emotional and individualistic Spaniard:

"The nineties were everywhere the period of anarchist terrorism. We have seen how the loss of its working-class adherents and the stupidity of police repressions led to this. But there were other causes as well. The reign of the bourgeoisie was now at its height. Their measures, their philistinism, their insufferable self-righteousness weighed upon every thing. They had created a world that was both dull and ugly and they were so firmly established in it that it seemed hopeless even to dream of revolution. . . . To shock, to infuriate, to register one's protest became the only thing that any decent or sensitive man could do. . . . Bomb outrages were acts of revenge for prison tortures or unjust sentences rather than protests against society in general."²

At the turn of the century, an attempt was made to introduce into Spain from France a form of "anarchist communism," which had secret directing groups and a central organization. When the loose federation of collectives which had been formed were thrown into bitter conflict by Spanish individualism, the compromise of Anarcho-Syndicalism was reached.³

Syndicalism, which has its source in the philosophy of Georges Sorel, was a movement which aimed at the uniting of all workers, irrespective of religious or political

1. de Madariaga, op. cit., p. 119.

2. Ibid., p. 162, 163.

3. Brenan, op. cit., p. 169.

views, in one group. Inspired with a new fighting spirit, this organization was to reject all corporate action or a political nature and to use the single weapon or the thorough and violent general strike to gain its ends.¹

In 1910, the C.N.T. was organized at seville. Its aim was to use syndicalism to fight the employers in order to gain the end of anarchism. In 1927, the F.A.I., a secret society composed exclusively of anarchists, was founded with the mission of deliberately and systematically preparing for a social revolution. It planned to penetrate and control the syndicalist organizations as soon as the latter could be re-established.²

Summing up the revolutionary trends of Spain's labor movements, Brennan says that over 60 years of anarchism had achieved practically nothing in the rural districts or the country, since in 1936 the standard of living of agricultural workers in the south was the same as it had been in 1870. In the cities, however, the Anarcho-Syndicalist movement had resulted in a considerable increase in wages.³ But just as much if not more good was done by socialism--and without the violence and terrorism which were characteristic of the agitation of the Anarcho-Syndicalists.

1. Brennan, op. cit., p. 170.

2. Ibid., p. 172-173.

3. Ibid., p. 187.

F. Politics and Politicians

"What share insolence and avarice have in creating revolutions, and how they work, is plain enough. When the magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public." - Aristotle¹

The diseased growth of French despotism which obstructed the healthy development of political ideas and institutions in Spain after the accession of the first Bourbon king, was largely responsible for the agitation, the violence, and the resulting instability which were to constitute the political pre-conditions for revolution--for the Revolution of 1931 which ended in the fall of the Spanish House of Bourbon.

During the reign of Charles III (1759-1788), the invasion of French 18th century ideas caused a split in Spain's intellectual leadership. Of the two schools of thought which were the result of the schism, one remained faithful to the old ideal of symbolic monarchy, a hold-over from Hapsburg days, while the second preached a philosophy of sovereignty of the people.²

The introduction of French centralization and French State despotism was to result in an attack upon the traditional rights and liberties of the Catalans and the Basques, and in an attack upon the political and economic power of the

1. Ibid., p. 213.

2. de Madariaga, op. cit., p. 55.

Spanish Church.

As soon as he was recognized as King of Spain, Philip V, by depriving Catalonia of her Cortes and liberties in 1714, was to begin the vigorous Bourbon policy of centralizing, which later stimulated the modern separatist movement in Catalonia and in the Basque Provinces.

In 1754, a Concordat was signed which placed the Spanish Church under the king, and during the reign of Charles III, many measures were undertaken to subject the clergy to the authority of the State. In 1766, a law requiring bishops to guard against priests saying anything derogatory about the State or the royal family was passed, and one year later, the Jesuits were expelled.¹

During the 19th and 20th centuries, the Spanish people attempted to build new institutions, but made the great mistake of trying to erect them upon the ruins of the old institutions. When the Monarchy was restored in December of 1874, after little more than a year of a Federal Republic which ended in complete failure, there was a chance that political habits might be developed in the Spaniard. But Don Canovas del Castillo, the Conservative politician who was largely responsible for the Restoration, was determined not to trust to free elections. Brennan says of Canovas and of the latter's fatal error in not enforcing an honest election law:

1. Chapman, "A History of Spain," p. 446.

"Although the press was free--that was one thing he insisted upon--there was not a single honest or genuine election to the Cortes during his life or indeed (since the system he set up continued after him) until the disappearance of the Monarchy in 1931."¹

All elections after the Restoration were controlled from Madrid and rigged in the municipalities. If, through some oversight, the "wrong" man was elected, irregularities were immediately discovered, the would-be councillor suspended, and new lists of voters drawn up including only the names of those who could be trusted to vote the "right" way. Often the same "trusted" voters were listed more than once, and according to Brennan, during one election, a cemetery of 700 "trusted" but departed souls voted as a body for the official candidate.²

The Government appointed large landowners, or "caciques," to organize districts, and to see that the "right" candidates were elected. During 1840-1917, when this evil was at its worst, the owners of great estates, in return for this service to the corrupt political authorities, were given the protection of civil governors, judges, magistrates, and police. Given authority to appoint mayors in the small towns and villages, to control local judges, and to distribute taxation, the "caciques" ruined their enemies with law suits, and excused themselves and their friends from paying taxes while levying a double or triple tax on those they hated.³

1. Ibid., p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 5.

3. Brennan, op. cit., p. 7.

Brenan quotes the distinguished historian Gumersindo de Azcarate on "caciquism:"

"Caciquism is simply a feudalism of a new kind, a hundred times more repugnant than the military feudalism of the Middle Ages."¹

During this period, the law courts gave no protection to the people for the judges and magistrates took their instructions from above as employees of the State, condemning or acquitting at a word from the civil governor.²

The corruption of Government employees, especially agents responsible for the collection of taxes, was notorious. In 1876, the President of the Supreme Court declared that one-third of all taxes collected went into the pockets of the agents and never reached the Government.³

Alfonso XIII, the last monarch to rule Spain, was a king from May 17, 1886, the day of his birth, and was declared of age in 1902. From de Madariaga's account, Alfonso was no statesman, but a first-rate politician:

". . . the king, while playing the game of outward politics with liberals and conservatives, came gradually to recognize but two parties in the real politics of the nation: the Church and the Army."⁴

Although Spain officially adopted a neutral stand during the first World War, the conflict had severe repercussions in that country. The nation was split in two, with the

1. Ibid., p. 8.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

3. Ibid., p. 9.

4. Ibid., p. 109.

liberal, progressive Left supporting the Allied cause, and the reactionary, clerical Right sympathetic to the Central Powers. De Madariaga says of the effect of foreign vitality which entered Spain and was in part responsible for the revolutionary general strike of August 10, 1917:

"The aim was political as well as social: a socialist democratic republic. The strike spread over the whole country. . . . A state of war was declared. . . . Three days sufficed to put down disorder. The Revolution left behind 2,000 prisoners, several hundred dead and wounded, and the Constitution dead. The Labour hotheads had delivered the nation and its hopeful assembly into the hands of the only force that remained: the Army."¹

The political scene in Spain between the end of the World War and the coup d'etat of General Primo de Rivera in 1923 was a panorama of strikes, disorders, crimes, of political and industrial murders, and of inefficient administration and military disaster in Morocco.

The year 1918 saw a Liberal government headed by Count Romanones in power. The fall of this regime was to see Spain pass through a brief period of Conservative reaction. But the government of Antonio Maura, in spite of its resorting to the most unscrupulous of methods to perpetuate its power, fell, to be succeeded by the Sanchez Toca ministry. Despite the fact that the Sanchez Toca administration was composed of die-hard Conservatives, determined efforts were made to solve the industrial problem and also make justice more than a word

1. Ibid., p. 238.

in Spain. But, unable to reconcile the employer's federation to the labor groups, the Toca government fell in March of 1922, and was succeeded by a coalition government of Liberals and Conservatives under Sanchez Guerra. This ministry was also of short duration, quitting office when it failed to settle the Moroccan question. A general election, held while a coalition of Liberals and reformers was in power, resulted in a majority for the government and in the presence of five Socialist members from Madrid in the government.

But the Moroccan situation remained unsolved, and the Army officers, no longer receiving the prize plums of leading overseas posts, were becoming more and more discontented until, in September of 1923, the Army rebelled and General Primo de Rivera, with the acquiescence of Alonzo XIII, became dictator of Spain. Constitutional government had come to an end in Spain. The king had broken his word, and in so doing removed the foundation of the Restoration.¹

The Spanish people had the alternative of a military dictatorship forced on them in 1923 because neither Liberals nor Conservatives, governing under the Constitution of 1876, could bring order out of chaos--could bring the political stability which Spain so desperately needed.

From November of 1885 to May of 1902, a period of 16 years and five months, Spain was governed by 11 ministries, each having an average life of one year and seven months. But,

1. de Madariaga, op. cit., p. 252,

under Alfonso XIII, from May of 1902 to September of 1923, the Spanish people were ruled by no less than 33 ministries, an average duration of seven and one-half months for each regime.¹ During the rule of the Conservatives between December of 1902 and July of 1905, five prime ministers and 66 new ministers held office.²

The author of "Spain" comments on the weaknesses of the political system which prepared the way for Primo de Rivera's seizure of power:

"The main fault of the old system, that which caused its incompetence and most of its corruption, was its instability. The kaleidoscopic succession of prime ministers and cabinets did not permit any political program to mature, any cabinet minister to acquire command over the affairs of his department, any complicated and delicate reform to take root and benefit by experience."³

But General Rivera was neither a Mussolini in miniature nor just another Spanish military policeman. De Madariaga says of the man and of the dictatorship:

"His originality lay in that he could not be easily classed as a Liberal or a reactionary leader. The century was rather eclectic in politics, and Primo de Rivera was of his century. Thus we shall see him a Liberal in municipal affairs, a Socialist of sorts in labour matters, a Conservative in constitutional ideas, a reactionary in education, an opportunist (with but scant opportunities) in military administration, a truly spirited leader in Moroccan affairs, and an indifferent amateur in foreign policy."⁴

"In its main lines the dictatorship was a

-
1. Ibid., p. 269.
 2. Ibid., p. 218.
 3. Ibid., p. 268.
 4. Ibid., p. 255.

regime founded on force rather than on authority, with a strong centralist tendency, relying on the Army, favourable to the Clerical Party and the Church, aristocratic and friendly to big landowners and sympathetic to Socialism as opposed to Syndicalism.¹ . . . The dictatorship made the nation pay too dearly for its material progress and in a coin which is more precious to her than wealth--liberty, justice and self-respect."²

Riots, strikes, civil discontent, protests from intellectuals, and the fall in the exchange value of the peseta were all factors contributing to the growing dissension between king and dictator, which came to a climax when, on January 30, 1930, Rivera was forced from office and retired to Paris where he died two months later.³

Brenan, in drawing three conclusions from the fall of the dictatorship, says that no government which has to depend upon the Church, the Army, and the landlords can find permanent support in Spain, that no government which represents a purely material well-being at the cost of liberty can satisfy the Spanish people, and that no dictator can prosper for any length of time in a country where half the population sits in cafes and criticizes the Government.⁴

General Damaso Berenguer succeeded Rivera as premier, but the year 1930 was one of discontent, a year of nation-wide strikes, a year which ended with the revolt, on December 12, of a garrison of 6,000 officers and men at Jaca, near the French

1. Ibid., p. 256.

2. Ibid., p. 263.

3. de Madariaga, in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 21, p. 146.

4. Ibid., p. 84.

border.¹ On February 15, 1931, Alonso suspended constitutional government and Sanchez Guerra, leader of the Constitutional party, was called in to form a cabinet. Three days later, the king changed his mind, re-established censorship, concentrated troops in Madrid, and asked Admiral Aznar to form a royal government.²

On March 22, in a Conservative attempt at conciliation prior to the municipal elections scheduled for April 12, a royal decree was issued restoring civil liberties, and universities were reopened. But the king's action on February 18 had united Socialist and Republican parties and brought the threat of general strike and revolution closer.³

When the crucial municipal elections were held on Sunday, April 12, the Republicans, Socialists and other Left groups captured 40 out of 49 provinces. Two days later, Alfonso resigned as King of Spain and went into exile. A new Ship of State, the Republic of Spain, was launched on the stormy sea of Spanish politics. The next five years were destined to determine whether or not the people of Spain were as unready for constitutional government as they proved to be in 1812, or in 1837, or in 1876.

Chapman, writing in 1925, had warned that too much weight should not be given to the political gropings of the

1. Foreign Policy Association, News Bulletin, January 2, 1931.

2. Ibid., February 27, 1931. 3. Ibid., April 3, 1931

Spanish people, for the power and the influence of the nobility, the wealthy and the clergy were still important factors with which democracy in Spain would have to contend.¹ The success or failure of democratic procedures and institutions in that country, then, was not a question to be decided by the people alone.

1. Ibid., p. 511.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT: THE ROAD TO COUNTER-REVOLUTION

In drafting the Constitution of 1931, the Left in Spain sowed the wind of social, economic, and religious revolution. Five years later, the Spanish people reaped the whirlwind of the bloodiest counter-revolution in recent history. The purpose of Chapter II will be to follow the Spanish Republic down the road which led to its ruin, in order to understand better the real issues in Spain during the five-year life of the Republic, the issues which were responsible for the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July of 1936.

A. The Constitution of 1931¹

"Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the constitution itself." - Aristotle²

The constituent Cortes of Republican Spain convened on July 14, 1931, and began the momentous task of framing a new constitution. On December 1, the new system of fundamental laws was submitted to a parliamentary committee for final re-drafting.³ The new charter, which contained 125 articles dealing with such vital subjects as National Organization, Nation-

1. See Current History, June, 1932, for complete text of the Constitution of the Spanish Republic, pp. 374-384.

2. Ibid., p. 227.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1931.

ality, Rights and Duties of Spaniards, the Cortes, the Presidency of the Republic, Government, Justice, the Public Treasury, and Guarantees and Amendments of the Constitution, represented the result of a compromise between all the parties of the Left and Center. The Socialists, represented by Fernando de los Rios, Francisco Largo Caballero, and Indalecio Prieto had insisted on such drastic measures as the separation of Church and State, the expulsion of the Jesuits, reform of the civil code, and state control of education.

The three chief defects of the Constitution were, in the opinion of de Madariaga, the weakness of the Executive, the lack of a Senate, and the attack on the power and influence of the Church.¹

Article 81 permitted the President of the Republic to dissolve the Cortes but once. If he used this power twice, the Cortes elected immediately afterward had to devote its first debate to an examination and approval or disapproval of the action. The unfavorable vote of an absolute majority of the Cortes would result in the removal of the Chief Executive.²

Although the Commission of Jurists appointed by the Provisional government had recommended that two houses of parliament be formed, a lower house plus a Senate of 240 members, the strong opposition of the Socialists defeated this proposal.³ Thus, even before the new vehicle of government took to the road, its mechanics refused to fit it with brakes.

1. Ibid., p. 301.

2. Current History, June, 1932, pp. 374-384.

3. de Madariaga, "Spain," p. 301.

Article 3 and Article 26 expressed the Republic's attitude towards the Church. In the former, Spain was declared to have no official religion. In Article 26, the State, regions, provinces and municipalities were prohibited from maintaining or favoring financial aid to the Church or to religious organizations; the Jesuit Order was dissolved and other religious orders were regulated by special law; clerical organizations were prohibited from the practice of industry, commerce or teaching; religious orders were obliged to submit annual accounts of the investment of their wealth, and all orders had to submit to the tax laws of the country. Article 26 further stated that the property of religious orders may be nationalized.

De Madariaga considers this attack upon the Church as both unwarranted and unwise. He says:

"Had the Republic left it alone, the mere creative work of the new regime in the field of letters, arts and sciences would have more than sufficed to reduce the Church to political impotence, for the Church had a tendency to fall owing to its own weight."¹

The new Constitution further provided, in Article 44, that the ownership of all types of property may be the object of forced expropriation in the interest of the social welfare, and that the socialization of property may also be carried out by means of indemnification. Public services and enterprises which affect the common interest, wherever such action is socially desirable, may also be nationalized under the authority of this article.

1. Ibid., p. 309.

The text of those articles in the Constitution of 1931 which were to make the charter of the new Republic a precondition for counter-revolution has been included in Appendix I of this thesis.

B. The Republic - 1931 to 1933

1. The First Year

On April 15, 1931, the constituent Cortes of the Spanish Republic was controlled by a coalition of Socialists, Radical Socialists, Accion Republicana, and other Left parties. The seats were distributed as follows:¹

Socialists	116
Radical Socialists	60
Republican Action (Azana)	30
Gallegans (voting with Azana)	16
Catalans	43
Federalists	17
Radicals (Lerroux)	90
Right (Agrarians, Basques, etc.)	60
Progressives (Zamora and Maura)	22

Under this alliance, headed by Manuel Azaña, leader of the Accion Republicana, the new Republic was to follow a reformist rather than a revolutionary policy. By the end of the year, Alcala Zamora, head of the Center parties, had been elected as President, and the Constitution had been approved.

After Azaña's accession to power, one of the first acts of the Cortes was to pass the "Law for the Defense of the Republic." This law gave the Home Secretary power to suspend public meetings, suppress associations, close clubs, take over unauthorized arms, and named eleven "acts of aggression

1. de Madariaga, op. cit., p. 300.

against the Republic" which made such offenses as strikes, rioting, spreading of subversive rumors, defense of the Monarchy, and official negligence punishable by fines or exile. The fear of a counter-revolution was probably responsible, as Peers says, for the paradox of having a Constitution guaranteeing the rights of the individual existing side by side with a law which placed such rights at the mercy of a single minister.¹

One of Azaña's first moves was against the power and prestige of the bulwark of the old regime, the Army. The Prime Minister himself took over the Ministry of War, abolished the Law of Jurisdictions,² abolished the Supreme Council of War and Navy and all ranks above that of division general, removed all officers not actively supporting the Republic, reduced the number of officers from 22,000 to 12,000, but offered those who resigned full retirement pay.³ It was in following this policy that Azana made one of his worst mistakes. While failing to destroy the power and influence of the Army, he did succeed in making it the Republic's most dangerous enemy.

The war of Church on Republic began less than one month after the fall of the Monarchy. On May 7, Dr. Pedro Segura, Cardinal-Archbishop of Toledo, issued a pastoral letter in which he said:

1. Ibid., p. 76.

2. See p. 9.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, May 6, 1932.

"In these moments of terrible uncertainty, every Catholic must measure the magnitude of his responsibilities and valiantly perform his duty. If we all keep our eyes fixed on higher interests, and sacrifice what is secondary to what is important; if we unite our forces and prepare to fight with perfect cohesion and discipline, without vain parade, but with faith in our ideals, with abnegation and the spirit of sacrifice, we shall be able to look at the future with tranquillity, confident of victory.

"If we remain quiet and idle; if we allow ourselves to give way to 'apathy and timidity'; if we leave the road open to those who are attempting to destroy religion or expect the benevolence of our enemies to secure the triumph of our ideals, we shall have no right to lament when bitter reality shows us that we had victory in our hands, yet knew not how to fight like intrepid warriors, prepared to succumb gloriously."¹

On May 24, the Vatican refused to accept Luis Zulueta, a distinguished scholar though unorthodox Catholic, as Ambassador from the Spanish Republic. The virtual expulsion of Cardinal Segura, on June 14, marked the beginning of the Republic's counter-attack upon the Church. On October 13, the Cortes, in accepting Article ³three of the Constitution, voted to abolish Roman Catholicism as the State religion. In January of 1932, the Jesuits were dissolved and expelled. Three months later, the Cabinet introduced legislation restricting the right of the Church to own property, empowering the government to control rigidly the activities of clergymen, and placing Church schools under State supervision.²

1. Peers, "The Spanish Tragedy 1930-1936," p. 53.

2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, May 6, 1932.

From its first days, the Republic was attacked by the extremists of the Left as well as by the extremists of the Right. Soon after the abdication of Alfonso XIII, the Anarchist Federation allied itself with a Syndicalist organization, the National Confederation of Labor. This Anarcho-Syndicalist combination was responsible for most of the early disorders.¹

In January of 1932, riots broke out in Bilbao and Valencia, but Azaña, just as firm with the Left as with the Right, crushed the rebellion by employing infantry, cavalry, and artillery.²

Ernest Galarza, in summarizing the achievements of the Republic during its first year, listed the five major problems still to be solved as: reconciliation of separatists, in particular the Catalans; balancing the budget; introduction of a public works program and a program of unemployment relief; repeal of the Law for the Defense of the Republic; and the passage of an agrarian reform law acceptable to both the peasants and the landlords.³

2. The Fall of the Azana Ministry

An attack on the Socialists by Alejandro Lerroux, leader of the Radicals, in which he invited the Monarchists to participate in a Right coalition in the event Azaña were forced from power, was in part responsible for the Spanish

1. Peers, op. cit., p. 90. 2. Ibid., p. 91.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, May 6, 1932.

Army's first attempt at a coup d'etat on August 10, 1932. General Jose Sanjurjo, former head of the Civil Guard, in an effort to "save the Republic," took the lead in a movement which resulted in the seizure of Seville and the attempted seizure of government buildings in Madrid. The revolt failed due to the prompt action of the Government, and to the paralyzing effect of a general strike called in Seville by the Socialist union.¹

On September 9, the Cortes passed by an overwhelming vote the Catalan Statute and the Land Reform Bill. The first act declared Catalonia an autonomous region within the Spanish State, and provided for a Generalitat, consisting of a Parliament, an Executive Council and a President (the President to be elected by the Cortes). The Generalitat was given power to control municipal administration and the police and court systems. It was also given authority to create new sources of revenue.²

The Agrarian Law, a concession to the extreme Left, provided for the expropriation of all land in areas where the evil of large estates was widespread. Indemnification for the land was to be allowed only on the value of the land as assessed for taxation.³

The vigorous suppression of an attempted military revolt in August, and the attack launched upon the separatist

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1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, August 19, 1932.
 2. Ibid., October 14, 1932.
 3. Peers, op. cit., p. 100.

and agrarian problems in September were steps which enhanced the prestige of the Azana regime. Brennan says of the Republic during this period:

"The autumn of 1932 saw Azana at the height of his career. In the eyes of Europe the new Spanish Republic had taken root and consolidated itself. Spain, it seemed, had ceased to be the country of the Black Legend--a semi-Balkan nation with a glorious history--and had become one of the most modern and dignified states in Europe."¹

But the prestige of the first Azaña ministry was to be of short duration, for, in January of 1933, armed revolts occurred in Barcelona, Lerida, and Valencia. The Government was expecting further trouble in Catalonia and Andalusia when an anarchist uprising took place in the hamlet of Casas Viejas. The ruthless suppression of this disturbance, during which 25 were killed, caused a wave of indignation to sweep the country and was to result in the Government and the Socialists losing the support of the working classes.² The enthusiasm of the masses for the Azaña administration had been cooling since the early days of 1932 when 120 of the more prominent members of the C.N.T. and F.A.I. had been deported to Spanish Guinea without trial, following the collapse of the uprising in Catalonia.³

The results of the municipal elections held on April 23, 1933 considerably weakened the position of the Government,

1. Ibid., p. 246.

2. Brenan, op. cit., p. 248.

3. Ibid., p. 254.

4. Foreign Policy Bulletin, May 12, 1933.

for the Azaña party captured but one-third of the seats, with the Monarchists and the Right-wing Republicans gaining two-thirds.⁴

On May 17, the Cortes passed the "Law of Confessions and Congregations," and on June 2, the day after the Vatican had published a circular letter condemning the bill, President Aleala Zamora signed it.¹ The law forbade the religious orders from engaging in any kind of political activity, in commerce or industry, and prohibited orders from engaging in teaching except to instruct its own members.

With the prisons full of extremists, and the nation virtually held in check by armed police, the Azaña regime, having already antagonized the Right, was, in the autumn of 1933, equally unpopular with the Left.

On September 12, as a result of the elections to the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees nine days earlier in which the Monarchists made a considerable show of strength, President Aleala Zamora requested and received the resignation of Premier Azaña. Alejandro Lerroux, called in to succeed Azaña, formed a cabinet made up primarily of members from the conservative Radical party, of which he was the leader.² Although Lerroux's party had the backing of multi-millionaire Juan March, the big landholders and other large property owners, and was not opposed to the Church, it could not be con-

1. Peers, op. cit., p. 136-137.

2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, September 22, 1933.

sidered as reactionary; so, the Spanish Republic at the fall of Azaña did not pass into the hands of anti-republican elements, but rather into the hands of right-wing republicans.

C. The Republic-- 1933 to February of 1936

1. The Election of 1933

Public sentiment in Spain favored general elections after the resignation of the Republic's first ministry. This was due to the prevailing feeling that, since the municipal elections of April and the recent elections to the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees indicated a swing to the Right, the Cortes of 1931 was no longer representative.¹ Elections were accordingly scheduled for November 19.

The campaign which followed brought to the forefront of the Spanish political scene for the first time, Jose Maria Gil Robles, leader of the Catholic Popular Action party. Gil Robles, who had served the dictator, Primo de Rivera, as an organizer, had been labeled "Fascist" by most of his enemies. Although, as Peers says, "Fascist" and "Marxist" were current terms of abuse in Spanish politics and shouldn't have been taken seriously,² Gil Robles seems to have aimed at the establishment of a regime similar to the Austrian Corporate State.³ Brennan quotes from a speech by Gil Robles to his followers made just prior to the 1933 election:

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, September 22, 1933.

2. Ibid., p. 145.

3. Brennan, op. cit., p. 267.

"We must move towards a new state. What matters if it means shedding blood? We need an integral solution--that is what we are seeking. In order to realize that ideal we will not detain ourselves in archaic forms. Democracy is for us not an end, but a means to go to the conquest of a new state. When the moment comes either the Cortes will submit or we will make it disappear."¹

Peers, in maintaining that Gil Robles had never given cause to doubt his loyalty to the Republic, says that the leader of the Catholic Popular Action party had accepted the Republic as legally constituted, and was convinced that it was possible to build within its framework a constitution quite satisfactory to Catholics.²

The election of November 19 resulted in an overwhelming defeat for the Socialists and the Center parties. The triumphant Right confederation of the Church, the landlords, the merchants and the manufacturers made immediate preparations to put into effect its program which called for the revision of the Constitution, the repeal of agrarian reform, the abrogation of anti-clerical legislation, and the limitation of the power of labor.³

The results of the election were as follows:⁴

Right groups

Catholic Popular Action	67	
Agrarians (landed interests)	86	
Basque Nationalists	14	
Navarrese, Traditionalists, and Monarchists	43	
Independents	2	<u>207</u>

1. Ibid., p. 280.

2. Ibid., p. 145.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, November 24, 1933.

4. de Madariaga, op. cit.

Center groups

Radicals	104	
Conservatives	18	
Conservative Catalan Home-Rulers	25	
Liberal Democrats	9	
Progressives	3	
Independents	8	<u>167</u>

Left groups

Socialists	58	
Communists	1	
Radical Socialists	5	
Accion Republicana (Azana)	5	
O.R.G.A. (Gallegan Left)	6	
Esquerra (Catalan Left)	19	
Federalists	2	<u>96</u>

Lerroux, asked by President Aleala Zamora to organize a cabinet of members of the Right and Center parties, was extremely cautious in making his selections and ended by balancing one member from the Right coalition with one member of the Left--a Gallegan Home-Ruler. Spain was to be ruled by a Center ministry dependent upon the Right, which controlled a majority of the seats in the Cortes.¹

Forced to resign on March 1, Lerroux returned to power two days later, only to bring back with him practically the same ministry as before.² Spain continued to be governed by a Center cabinet--hence by a party which was in the minority. It was not surprising to find this situation extremely unsatisfactory to the Right coalition, and no more satisfactory to the Left.

But, although they would much prefer to see Lerroux in power than Gil Robles, the Socialists and other Left parties

1. Ibid., p. 324.

2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, March 9, 1934.

were strongly opposed to any modification of the anti-clerical and the labor legislation passed during the Azana administration. Apprehensive lest the President be forced to do the natural thing and call in Gil Robles, leader of the majority coalition, the chief of the extremists within the Socialist party, Francisco Largo Caballero, repeatedly threatened to oppose any "aggression" from the Right with a violent revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat.¹

During this period of crisis, President Aleala Zamora persisted in his efforts to keep Gil Robles from the position of power to which, under the parliamentary system, he was entitled. In the spring of 1934, when he should have called for a coalition of the Gil Robles-Lerroux forces, the President named as Premier, Ricardo Samper, an insignificant member of Lerroux's Radical party, whose administration was to prove even less satisfactory to both extremes than had its predecessor.²

The chances for the continuance of constitutional government became less promising as the summer of 1934 wore on. There was increasing evidence that, behind the scenes, extreme reactionary and extreme revolutionary groups were preparing for a clash of arms.

The crisis came soon after the Catalan Generalitat was permitted to enact a law by which peasants were granted

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, March 9, 1934.

2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, September 28, 1934.

small holdings of land at the expense of the big landowners, and Premier Samper was vehemently denounced by Gil Robles for his lack of firmness in dealing with the Catalan leader, Luis Companys.¹ This growing impatience of the Right groups brought about the fall of Samper, and, on October 4, Alejandro Lerroux, for the first time in the history of the new Republic, formed a cabinet composed entirely of members of conservative groups. Radicals and right-wing republicans were in the majority, but the cabinet also included three members of Gil Robles' Catholic Popular Action party.²

2. The Revolution of 1934.

Largo Caballero's bluff had been called on October 4. During the next two days, a revolt broke out in Oviedo, Madrid, and Barcelona. On October 5, an attempt was made to call a general strike throughout the nation.³ The next day, Luis Companys denounced the "monarchizing and Fascist forces" seeking to betray the Republic and proclaimed the independence of the Catalan Republic.⁴

The Catalan revolt was crushed within 12 hours, and the rebellion in Asturias was put down only after an orgy of merciless torture and slaughter, of which Peers says:

"Of no event that had yet occurred during the life of the Republic were related stories more terrible, and more incredible, on both sides, of cold-blooded torture and murder, mutilation, wanton destruction. . . ."⁵

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1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, September 28, 1934.
 2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, October 12, 1934.
 3. Peers, op. cit., p. 164.
 4. Foreign Policy Bulletin, October 12, 1934.
 5. Peers, op. cit., p. 168-169.

De Madariaga, in commenting on the events which brought about the uprising of 1934, says:

"The revolt of 1934 is unpardonable. The decision of the President in calling the C.E.D.A., the Catholic Popular Action party to share in the Government was not only unimpeachable, not only unavoidable, but long overdue. The argument that Senor Gil Robles intended to bring in Fascism was both hypocritical and demonstrably untrue. It was hypocritical because everybody knew that the Socialists of Senor Largo Caballero were dragging the other Socialists to a rebellion against the Republic of 1931 quite apart from Senor Gil Robles and in the teeth of Azana's opposition to such a desperate course; demonstrably untrue because, had Senor Gil Robles meant to destroy the Constitution by violent means, the defeat of the rebellion of 1934 gave him a golden opportunity to do so--and he did not take it. . . . With the rebellion of 1934, the Left lost every shred of moral authority to condemn the rebellion of 1936."¹

The author quoted above adds the interesting observation that the coalition of clericals and conservatives, the government alleged to be a deadly threat to the liberties of Spain, did not take the life of a single leader of the revolt.²

3. The Republic to February 1936

When the Lerroux ministry collapsed on May 3, 1935, Gil Robles had every right to expect that his time to assume leadership of the Government had finally come. But President Alcala Zamora again thwarted the head of the Catholic Popular Action party, by asking Lerroux to succeed himself. However, when the new ministry was formed, the C.E.D.A. did manage to

1. Ibid., p. 332-333.

2. Ibid., p. 334.

secure five cabinet posts, including the War Office which was taken over by Gil Robles himself.¹

During this administration, the aim of the conservative elements was to amend the articles in the Constitution concerning the powers of the President, the second chamber, expropriation powers of the Cortes, religious matters, divorce, and home-rule.

The Lerroux government fell again on September 25, and Jacquin Chapaprieto formed a ministry which was to last until the conservative groups blocked the Premier's attempt to increase slightly the tax on the moneyed interests three months later.²

After making several attempts to form a government which would satisfy all parties, President Aleala Zamora named an ex-Monarchist and now Center politician, Portela Valladares, as Premier. On January 7, 1936, the new Premier was granted the decree dissolving the Cortes, and the political stage was set for the holding of another general election.³

4. The Election of February 1936

In the less than five years of its existence, from April of 1931 to January of 1936, the Republic had failed to bring political stability to Spain. The presence of more than 18 party hats in the political ring of that country might go a long way towards explaining the rise and fall, during this

1. de Madariaga, op. cit., p. 336.

2. Ibid., p. 339.

3. Ibid., p. 339.

brief period, of 28 cabinets composed of 90 different ministers.¹

A month before the February election, the Monarchist, Catholic Popular Action, conservative and right-wing republican deputies in the Cortes, finally took action against the President. A petition was drawn up and circulated in an attempt to obtain the required number of signatures necessary in order to bring impeachment proceedings against Aleala Zamora, who was charged with refusing to offer the Premiership to Robles and the Catholic Popular Actionists, and with suspending parliamentary sessions for 45 days while the Constitution limited such suspension to 15 days.²

In the meanwhile, Alejandro Lerroux had been moving the conservative elements under his leadership farther and farther to the Right, until, on February 2, he declared in a speech at Barcelona:

"It is true I was considered Spain's most dangerous revolutionary in the time of the monarchy, but you find me in conservative company now because Spain today is threatened with a revolutionary menace that will destroy her culture, social order and civilization by replacing the republic with a communist state that takes orders from Moscow."³

The issues in the campaign of February, 1936, were clear-cut. It was a fight between Azaña and Gil Robles, between the Left and the Right. All the parties of the Left, including the left wing of the Radical Party, led by Martinez

1. New York Times, January 2, 1936, p. 11.

2. New York Times, January 3, 1936, p. 11.

3. New York Times, February 3, 1936, p. 13.

Barrio, formed a Popular Front coalition in a pact which was published on January 15, 1936. The parties of the Right allied themselves in an anti-Marxist front.¹

The results of the general election of February 15 showed a complete victory for the Popular Front:²

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Deputies</u>
Popular Front	4,206,156	258
Center	681,047	62
Right	3,783,601	152

But, according to the figures presented by de Madariaga, although the Left had beaten the Right, the Center Left had beaten the extreme Left:³

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Deputies</u>
Left Center (Azana)	2,413,200	148
Socialists and Communists	1,793,000	110

In pointing to the fact that only one in every three within the Marxist group was in favor of an immediate social revolution, de Madariaga says that Spain declared herself, in this election, to be:⁴

1. - By two to one against Marxism;
2. - By two to one against Clericals and Militarists;
3. - By eight to one against a Socialist revolution;
4. - Almost unanimously against a military revolution.

D. The Republic - February 1936 to July 1936

The news of the Popular Front's victory was greeted with mass demonstrations, riots, and prison and jail breaks.

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1. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 339.
 2. Ibid., p. 340.
 3. Ibid., p. 341.
 4. Ibid., p. 343.

As the demands of amnesty for all political prisoners increased, the situation grew worse until martial law was declared in some cities.¹

On February 19, Premier Portela Valladares and his cabinet resigned, and Manuel Azaña was asked to form a ministry. Since the Socialists refused to share power, hence responsibility, Azaña's cabinet was composed of members of his own Republican Action party, and two members of Martinez Barrios' Republican Union party.²

After Azaña had pleaded for order, a general amnesty was decreed in Spain, freeing all persons convicted of or awaiting trial for political and social offenses.³ The release of political prisoners only served to increase the wave of lawlessness sweeping the country. Peers says of these riots:

"The best that can be said about the riots that took place during the months following the General Election is that they seem nearly all to have been spontaneous, unorganized acts of hooliganism, due to the return of exiled extremists and to the ebullition of feeling at the return to power of the Left after a period of eclipse. . . ."⁴

Soon after Azaña resumed power, it became increasingly evident that he would either have to depend upon the support of the 89 Socialists and the 14 Communists in the Cortes, or ally himself with the Center and the more conservative republican groups. Francisco Largo Caballero was reported by

1. New York Times, February 20, 1936, p. 9.

2. Ibid.

3. New York Times, February 22, 1936, p. 1.

4. Peers, op. cit., p. 194.

William P. Carney as saying, before the election, that a victory for the Socialists and their liberal but capitalist allies would be only a stepping stone to a Soviet regime in Spain similar to that in Russia.¹ One week later, the same correspondent stated that while Azaña's policy showed that the new regime was willing to compromise with the Marxists, if such a course was not possible, the Premier would ruthlessly suppress the extreme Left as he did when previously in power.²

The breach between the Left and the Right was even wider by the end of March, when all but 40 of the more than 200 Center and Right deputies-elect withdrew from the Cortes in protest against an order which made invalid the election of Rightists in Granada and other constituencies.³ The 160 deputies returned to their seats a few days later when the Premier, in reassuring the conservatives that there was no real danger of communism in Spain, pleaded for their support.⁴

On May 10, when Azaña was elected President by the Cortes, he offered to make Indalecio Prieto, leader of the moderate Socialists, his Premier.⁵ But when the Largo Caballero extremists were violently opposed to any active Socialist participation in the Government, the new President named Santiago Cesares Quiroga, one of his closest friends and Minister of Interior during the attempted revolt of 1932, as the man to form a ministry.

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1. New York Times, March 15, 1936, p. E-7.
 2. New York Times, March 22, 1936, p. E-7.
 3. New York Times, April 1, 1936, p. 18.
 4. New York Times, April 4, 1936, p. 7.
 5. New York Times, May 17, 1936, p. E-4.

Gil Robles, speaking before the Cortes on June 16, condemned the Government for its failure to take strong action against the wave of violence and crime which was destroying law and order in the Republic. Gil Robles presented statistics which showed that, since the February election, 340 strikes had been called, 269 persons had been killed in disorders, 160 churches had been completely burned, and 251 Catholic temples, convents, and school buildings partly destroyed.¹

Brenan is of the opinion that practically all of the churches burned during this period were burned by Anarchists and that most of the priests were killed by them,² while Peers says of the failure of the Government to take strong action:

"It was unfortunate that the first targets of popular violence should have been churches, for the inactivity of the forces of law and order in suppressing the outbreaks was interpreted, at least by implication, as pointing to a new period of official anti-clerical policy. As a matter of fact, it seems to have been due rather to a desire not to excite mob feeling and to the hope that, if left alone, it would in the course of a few weeks die a normal death."³

As the summer of 1936 approached, the Popular Front government, menaced from the Right and from the Left, tried desperately to fulfill its tasks, but with slight hope of success. But, though some of the troubles of the Spanish Republic in the early summer of 1936 were the result of developments

1. New York Times, June 21, 1936, p. E-5.

2. Ibid., p. 189.

3. Ibid., p. 194.

stemming from the February election, the real causes for the failure of the Republic to bring order out of chaos were much deeper. De Madariaga, in tracing some of these causes back to 1931, says:

" . . . Azaña was unable to conquer his aversion towards Lerroux. . . Even as a big river can be traced to a slender brook, so the Spanish Civil War may be said to begin on that day when Azaña made up his mind that he could not go hand in hand with the Radical party."¹

Of the split within the Spanish Socialist party which contributed to the insurmountable obstacles the young Republic met on the road to democracy, de Madariaga declares:

"Needless to say, a Marxist political formation might and should have been one of the most solid foundations of the Republic; but the Spanish Socialist party was deeply divided. Two of its three leaders, Prieto and Besteiro, were for an evolutionary policy in cordial collaboration with the progressive and genuine liberals who followed Azaña. The third, however, Largo Caballero, had thrown to the winds the political wisdom of a lifetime, and, sowing his political wild oats at the time when people quietly eat the tasteless porridge of experience, he was leading the fiery socialist youth movement towards the proletarian revolution."²

But despite Largo Caballero's threat of violent revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat, it would have been impossible, in the summer of 1936, for the socialist extremists to successfully make their revolution against the combined forces of the Civil Guard and the Army. Brennan, in advancing this theory, maintains:

1. Ibid., p. 297.

2. Ibid., p. 294.

"There was really only one chance of Caballero's attaining power and that was that the generals should rise, that the Government should distribute arms to the people and that the people should win. Consciously or unconsciously, he and his party were gambling on there being a military insurrection."¹

Largo Caballero's chances for putting his threatened revolution across were even more remote after July 1. On that day, the moderate faction of the Socialist party, led by Indalecio Prieto, scored a major triumph over the revolutionary element. Ramon Gonzales Peña, a close friend of Prieto and a moderate, was elected president of the new executive committee. This event, plus the fact that 54 of the 100 Socialist deputies in the Cortes now followed the lead of Prieto, while 46 took orders from Largo Caballero, meant to the New York Times that, from July 1 on, the moderate Socialists would, in all probability, have much more to say about the policy of the party than they had in the past.²

But the Republic was being threatened from the Right as well as from the Left, by Fascism as well as by the Caballero brand of Socialism.

The Spanish Falange, founded in 1932 by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the dictator, merged with other small Fascist groups two years later. Until after the elections of February 1936, the party, whose membership was composed primarily of university students, was very small and was ignored

1. Ibid., p. 305.

2. New York Times, July 2, 1936, p. 12.

and even disliked by the Church and the landlords.¹ In the February election, the Fascists polled only 5,000 votes in Madrid, but soon afterward many of Gil Robles' supporters deserted him to put their trust in either the Monarchists, led by Calvo Sotelo, or in the Falange. In April 1936, the Gil Robles' Youth Organization, under the lead of its secretary, Serrano Suñer, merged with the Falange, which proceeded to match the Anarchists and other Left extremists in acts of terror and assassination throughout the spring and summer.²

Peers discusses Fascism in Spain in the following passages:

"Spanish Fascism was, of course, a very different proposition in 1936 from anything that it had been during previous governments. Then it was an almost academic party--just one group among many which could be counted on to support the Right in the Cortes. . . . Had the Right been successful in the February elections, Fascism would no doubt have continued to develop within it, but it would have developed slowly. . . . But when the Popular Front came into power in February 1936, there set in a reactionary movement not at all unlike the movement in the opposite direction which had begun after the victory of the Centre two years earlier. The majority of the Right-wing groups were content to abide the consequences of the electorate's decision and to go into opposition until their turn came at last for power. But the Fascists were not."³

By mid-July, it was evident that the struggle of the Center to keep the two extremes from tearing the Spanish Republic asunder had been in vain. Behind the din of Fascist-

1. Brenan, op. cit., p. 308.

2. Ibid., p. 309.

3. Ibid., p. 206-207.

Socialist street fighting and behind the terror of assassination, forces were at work within and outside the Cortes, conspiring against the Republic. Brennan maintains that the Monarchists had never ceased plotting against the Republic since 1931, and that their leader, Antonio Goicoechea, had been communicating secretly with the Italian Government since 1933. This author also is convinced that Calvo Sotelo had worked for a rebellion, had served as a link between Army officers, Falangists, and conservatives, and had done his utmost to prevent any reconciliation between the Catholic Popular Actionists and the Azaña Republicans.¹

The U.M.E. - Union Militar Espanola -- a secret society of Army officers were also actively plotting against the Government. Brennan says that the preparations for a military rising were far advanced by July 1936, and that the U.M.E. had been in contact with both Germany and Italy for months.²

On July 12 came the climax. Lieutenant Castillo, a leader of shock troops and a Communist-sympathizer who had been particularly effective in combating violence from the Right, was assassinated by Fascists. On the same night, Calvo Sotelo was kidnapped from his home, slain, and delivered to a cemetery.³

Four days later, on July 16, 1936, the Army revolted at Tetuan, in Spanish Morocco. The Spanish Civil War had begun.

1. Ibid., p. 311.

2. Brennan, op. cit., p. 310.

3. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 351.

CHAPTER III

CIVIL WAR

Since a military history of the Spanish Civil War has no place in this study, events of a military nature will be referred to in this chapter only as they have a direct bearing on the political, and some of the more important social and economic developments which took place within Spain during the tragic years, 1936-1939.

A. The Last Days of the Republic

1. Behind the Outbreak

Although it was the Right and not the Left which struck the first blow against the Spanish Republic on July 16, 1936, the Government itself, as well as the Left, must accept its share of direct and immediate responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict.

When the Government refused to allow a public debate on the Sotelo murder and adjourned the Cortes, parliamentary procedures came to an end, for the conservative opposition announced their permanent withdrawal from the Cortes.¹ This crisis provided the military extremists with just the opportunity they had been waiting for.

The Left must shoulder its share of the blame for July 16, the fateful day which marked the beginning of the end

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, July 31, 1936.

for the Spanish Republic. If the Socialists and other extremists had not persisted in their stubborn and disastrous policy of refusing to share power and responsibility with the Left Republicans after the Popular Front victory, constitutional government would have had a chance in Spain. But, deprived of the support of those who had shared in the election triumph of February, the Azaña and Quiroga ministries were helpless when confronted by a series of paralyzing strikes, called by Syndicalists, Communists, and Caballero Socialists, which crippled the economic life of the nation.

However, in all fairness, some consideration must be given to the argument of J. Alvarez del Vayo, who maintains that many of these strikes--145 new ones were called in the month beginning June 16¹-- were provoked by the series of lock-outs declared by industrialists of Fascist sympathies.²

Many militarists sincerely believed that the tactics of the extreme Left constituted part of a deliberate plan to "wreck" constitutional government and prepare the way for the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. But there were others who had plans of their own.

There seems to be little doubt that the military revolt had been planned for some time before the actual beginning of hostilities. Del Vayo quotes ex-Premier Portela Valladares as stating in 1937:

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, July 31, 1936.

2. Ibid., p. 16.

"At four in the morning on the day after the elections, I was visited by Senor Gil Robles who proposed that I should assume dictatorial powers, and who offered me the support of all the groups defeated in the elections. At seven that evening the same suggestion was made to me by General Francisco Franco himself."¹

Brenan, in referring to this allegation by Portela Valladares, an ex-Monarchist who had never strayed further to the Left than the Center, declares that these proposals from the Right constituted the real reason why the Premier resigned suddenly on February 19, without even waiting for the assembly of the new Cortes.²

In the opinion of Lawrence A. Fernsworth, although the privileged classes, the Army, and the Church all knew that a revolt from the Right would throw the door wide open to the violent social revolution of the extreme Left, these forces of reaction--in order to salvage their own material interests--willingly provided the spark which started the conflagration that destroyed the Republic and made the cause of democracy a hopelessly lost one no matter which faction emerged triumphant.³

Although he concedes that both Russian Communism and German-Italian Fascism had shown considerable interest in the Spanish Civil War before it actually started, de Madariaga, in taking the position that neither Russian nor the Fascist States were responsible for the outbreak of the conflict says:

1. Ibid., p. 6.

2. Ibid., p. 301.

3. Foreign Affairs, October 1936, p. 101.

" . . . it is a fact that the actual outbreak was the combined effect of two typically Spanish pronunciamientos: that of Don Francisco Largo Caballero, Commander-in-Chief of the revolutionary wing of the General Union of Workers (U.G.T.), which was not Communist, and that of Don Francisco Franco, Commander-in-Chief of the rebellious General Union of Officers (U.M.E.), which was not Fascist. In July 1936 these two men incarnated the Spanish tradition of violent interference in internal affairs. We are to see that Azaña, belatedly, thought of incarnating the other Spanish tradition, that of reasonable compromise and mutual understanding so admirably cultivated in Spain by Don Francisco Giner. In this battle of the three Franciscos, the true, the great, the creative Francisco, the hope of Spain, was crushed out of action by the other two. . . ."1

2. The Conflict-- July to September 1936

On July 18, the cabinet of Premier Santiago Cesares Quiroga resigned, and Martinez Barrio, speaker of the Cortes and leader of the Republican Union, organized a new ministry with himself as Premier. Within three hours of its assuming power, the Barrio government fell, and President Azaña called upon Jose Giral to form a cabinet.²

When Giral assumed leadership of the embattled Republic, one of the first acts of the new regime was to issue weapons to 50,000 Marxist militiamen.³ The author of "Spain" gives the following account of the first days of the Republic's struggle:

1. Ibid., p. 367.

2. New York Times, July 19, 1936, p. 1.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletins, July 31, 1936.

"On the Republican side, the Giral cabinet ceased to count the moment it handed weapons over to the Unions. The ministers lived the first days of the war inside the Ministry of the Navy, barricaded against their own followers. The country gave itself over to the two ruling passions of the Spaniards: dictatorship and separatism. Every region, town, province and village had its own government; every working class organization also. Some attention was paid to the Civil War, but more to the proletarian revolution."¹

The proletarian revolution made considerable headway after the wholesale arming of the masses which took place during the first days of the conflict. In Catalonia, the National Confederation of Labour (C.N.T.)-- headed by Anarchists and Syndicalists, immediately organized for the social revolution, and began a campaign of slaying prominent persons, razing churches and convents, and destroying all land registration offices.²

Forced to rely upon the support of the great mass of workers and peasants, the Giral administration, through various decrees, began to put into effect its own radical reform program. On July 28, a decree was issued by the Ministry of Education which authorized all governors and mayors of every province and city of Spain to confiscate all buildings and teaching equipment belonging to religious orders.³ This decree ordered the enforcement of Article 26 of the Constitution of 1931. Two days later, the entire Spanish merchant fleet was confiscated and placed at the disposal of the Navy.⁴

1. Ibid., p. 374.

2. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 375.

3. New York Times, July 29, 1936, p. 1.

4. Foreign Policy Bulletin, August 7, 1936.

On August 1, all electrical concerns and two broadcasting stations were seized, and on August 3, the munitions and aviation industries were nationalized, while special committees were established to control the Madrid banks; Marxist militiamen were exempted from paying rent; and a 40-hour week and 15 percent wage increase were put into effect.¹

3. The Insurgents

A military dictatorship which had little to do with Fascism had complete charge of the rebellion during the first three months of the Civil War. The Governing Junta, set up by General Cabanellas and including five generals and two colonels, had practically complete control of the Army, the Civil Guard, the Moorish troops, and the Foreign Legion, while the Government had no regular troops and few regular officers.² General Sanjurjo, who had led the attempted Army coup in 1932, was originally scheduled to head the Insurgent forces, but was killed in an air crash while en route to take command from Lisbon.

Among the first steps taken by the Rebels in the territories controlled by them were the suspension of agrarian reform, the return of rural property to landlords, and the return of compulsory religious instruction to the schools.³

According to de Madariaga, it was not until October

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, August 7, 1936.

2. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 372-373.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, January 22, 1937.

1, 1936, when General Francisco Franco became Generalissimo of the Insurgent forces, that the Spanish military revolt began to take on the appearance of a Fascist foreign inspired movement.¹

On April 19, 1937, General Franco established a single party under his leadership, and ordered the dissolution of all other political groups and militia organizations. This decree did away with the Catholic Popular Action party of Gil Robles, with the Phalanx, as it had been organized by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, and with two Monarchist parties. The new party adopted the 26-point program of the Fascists as its platform.²

Rather than dominate the Spanish Falange through suppression, General Franco elected to put himself at its head. On August 4, 1937, all officers and non-commissioned officers in the Insurgent army became members of the reorganized Falange.³ On October 21, the Insurgents announced the establishment of a Fascist National Council, in which the Carlist Monarchists and the Falange were represented along with the military commanders.⁴ In January 1938, Ramon Serrano Suñer, brother-in-law of Franco and leading spokesman for Nazi-Fascism in Spain, was charged with the political reorganization of the new party.⁵

1. Ibid., p. 373.

2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, April 39, 1937.

3. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 398.

4. Foreign Policy Bulletin, November 5, 1937.

5. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 398.

B. Rebels and Revolutionists

The rapid advances of the Insurgent forces during the early weeks of the conflict brought about the fall of the Giral government, and, on September 4, Francisco Largo Caballero formed the Republic's fourth war-time ministry. The new cabinet, which for the first time was composed of nearly all the groups that had shared in the Popular Front victory of February, included six Socialists, two Communists, one Basque Nationalist, one Catalan Leftist, one Republican Unionist, and two Left Republicans.¹

De Madariaga maintains that on this day, the day that Caballero assumed power, the Republic met its death, and the Civil War became a struggle between rebels and revolutionists.²

On November 4, when four of their representatives were taken into the cabinet, the Anarcho-Syndicalists participated in the Popular Front government for the first time.³

After Largo Caballero had submitted the resignation of his cabinet on May 15, 1937, he was immediately charged by President Azaña with the responsibility of organizing and heading a new government.⁴ However, when the Premier ran into considerable difficulty in reassembling a ministry which would satisfy all parties, Azaña gave the task to Dr. Juan Negrin, a Socialist and former Finance Minister. Largo Caballero and

1. New York Times, September 5, 1936, p. 1.

2. Ibid., p. 382.

3. New York Times, November 5, 1936, p. 22.

4. New York Times, May 16, 1937, p. 1.

J. Alvarez del Vayo were excluded from the new governing body which included two Communists, three Socialists, two Left Republicans, one Republican Unionist, and one Basque Nationalist.¹

In noting this move by the Loyalist Government, Herbert L. Matthews said in a New York Times article:

"Dr. Negrin's success in forming the Cabinet represented a victory for his view that power ought to be concentrated in a strong and relatively liberal central government representing the middle as well as the working classes in order to direct the Loyalist cause more efficiently."²

But de Madariaga goes behind the headlines in search of the real reasons for the cabinet change of May 17:

"It may still be found on closer scrutiny that in ousting Senor Largo Caballero, the Communists, both Russian and Spanish were the only actors who knew the script of the whole play, while Don Indalecio Prieto and Dr. Negrin knew little more than some cues and the hard fact that they were getting rid of their rival in the Socialist party. That in the mind of Dr. Negrin the new cabinet meant a move to the Right, to authority, order and centralization was obvious. He gave the Foreign Office to Senor Giral, a friend of President Azaña, with the hope either of conquering British and French opinion or of initiating some peace move or both."³

The ousting of Largo Caballero and the Anarchists resulted in a serious split within the ranks of the Left. Both the leader of the U.G.T. and Andres Nin, leader of the P.O.U.M. (extreme Communist faction) considered the Negrin regime as bourgeoisie, and were determined to fight its policy which apparently was one of concentrating on the winning of the war

1. New York Times, May 18, 1937, p. 15.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 397.

and letting the proletarian revolution slip into the background.¹

Charles A. Thomson attributed much of the friction among the Loyalists to the increasing strength of the Communist party, which from the outbreak of war to the autumn of 1937 had grown from 50,000 to 400,000 members. According to this writer, the Communists had made a successful attempt to win the support of the small farmers and business men, by making the best of a policy of moderation toward socialization of industry and agriculture.²

On October 1, 1937, when the Cortes met at Valencia, the Negrin government received the confidence of not only a majority of the Socialist deputies, the Communists, and the Left Republicans, but also of Miguel Maura and ex-Premier Portela Valladares, leaders of the two Center parties who resumed their seats in the Cortes.³

In March 1938, Charles A. Thomson reported that the rising power and influence of Indalcelo Prieto, at this time Minister of National Defense, together with the curbing of Communist influence in the Army, the strengthening of the Center and middle class groups in the Cortes, and the increasing tendency on the part of the authorities to permit private religious services, all indicated a noticeable drift toward moderation.⁴

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1. New York Times, August 10, 1937, p. 1.
 2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, November 5, 1937.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Foreign Policy Bulletin, March 11, 1938.

C. The Triumph of Reaction

In spite of the defeat of the Revolutionary Government in Catalonia and the occupation of Barcelona on January 26, 1939, Premier Negrin was determined to continue the struggle to the end. On February 1, before a skeleton meeting of the Cortes, Negrin laid down as the conditions for peace: a guarantee of Spanish independence from foreign influence; a plebiscite to determine the form of government desired by the people; liquidation of the Civil War without persecution, and freedom for all Spaniards to join in the country's reconstruction.¹

On February 21, President Azaña, now in Paris, expressed the opinion that all further resistance would be useless. Seven days later, he resigned after being informed that, on February 27, Great Britain and France had recognized the Insurgents. With Azaña in Paris at this time were President Aguirre of the Basque Government, President Companys of the Catalan Republic, and Martinez Barrio, President of the Cortes.²

A National Defense Council replaced the Negrin cabinet on March 5. General Jose Miaja was elected as its President, while Colonel Sigismundo Casado, a key figure in the coup d'etat, which ousted Negrin, became Minister of Defense. On March 7, the Communists, who were not represented on the Council, revolted in a movement which was suppressed six days later.³

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, February 17, 1939.

2. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 415.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, April 7, 1939.

Peace negotiations were carried on from March 13-19, only to be abruptly broken off by the Rebels who promptly launched a new offensive. But on March 26, the Insurgents reopened negotiations by broadcasting their conditions of peace, which sounded reasonable enough for the officers of the Loyalist Army to disband their units.¹

By April 1, 1939, the bloody civil strife had officially been brought to a close. During the first few months of the war, the youngest of Europe's republics had been destroyed. The assassins, the extremists of the Right and the extremists of the Left, then became locked in a fierce struggle over the dead body of Spanish democracy, until, after two and one-half years which knew neither mercy nor compassion, the forces of reaction were to triumph over the forces of revolution. Some of the reasons for the victory of the Right over the Left--and Center--in Spain will be included in the chapters immediately following.

1. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 413.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHURCH AND THE WAR

It was pointed out in Chapter I that since the hierarchy, the orders, and the clergy have exerted a tremendous influence over the political, economic, and social institutions of Spain during the past century, the Spanish Church must share responsibility for the pre-conditions which made the Revolution of 1931 inevitable. On the other hand, as was seen in Chapter II, the violent anti-clericalism of the Spanish masses and the anti-clerical measures taken by the Government during the five years of the Republic were important factors contributing to the Counter-Revolution of 1936.

During the Civil War, the Spanish Church, the Vatican, and the Roman Catholic hierarchy throughout the world adopted an attitude and took certain steps which have been bitterly attacked in some circles and staunchly defended in others. An attempt will be made in Chapter IV to determine the reasons why and the extent to which the Spanish Church participated in the war, and the extent to which the Vatican and the hierarchy were responsible for turning public opinion against the Loyalist Government and in favor of the Insurgents.

A. The War and the Spanish Church

When the Army, the Civil Guard, the Foreign Legion, and most of the law enforcers threw in their lot with the Insurgents after July 16, 1936, and the Giral ministry, with no

adequate means by which to cope with the serious crisis, was forced to arm the peasants and the workers, the undisciplined Spanish masses turned against all that they could associate with a past of oppression and exploitation. Unfortunately, the storm of violent passions fell most heavily upon churches, convents, temples, and schools which went up in flames throughout the country, and upon priests, monks, and even nuns who were slain in the streets.

Was this terrible fury, unleashed by the outbreak of the conflict, deliberately inspired by the Loyalist Government, by the Communists, or was it, as Reinhold Niebuhr has said, the result of a terrible increment of vengeance piling up for years in the soul of the Spanish peasant?¹

Indalecio Prieto, admitting these outrages committed against the Church and the clergy, during an interview in New York in December 1938, said in defense of the Loyalist cause:

"In truth I cannot nor do I wish to deny that at the beginning of the military uprising there were deplorable excesses on our side. But what I do deny is that such excesses have been at any time ordered or inspired by the Government. In fact, they were quickly ended as soon as the Government, which most of the army and police had deserted, was able to assert its authority."²

But, even before the outbreak of the Civil War, as Church properties were being destroyed by violence, the Church was becoming implicated in the plot against the Republic. Richard Neville maintains that it was common knowledge in Spain

1. The Christian Century, September 2, 1936, p. 1158.

2. New York Times, December 12, 1938, p. 10.

that the outlawed Falange kept its membership intact and met secretly in Church properties until it came out into the open on July 18.¹

Less than a month after the outbreak of the Civil War, in the August 7, 1936 edition of The Catholic Herald, of London, the following view was expressed concerning the rebellion in Spain:

"... Yet the anti-communist dictatorships, and they alone, present a military shield against communist dictatorships, both in their own countries and for Christendom as a whole. . . if we are speaking of all that shows itself above ground, being neither of the inner life nor of the catacombs, then armed protection, open or disguised, always has been and always must be necessary to ensure its safety against violent enemies. . . ."2

In regard to such an attitude as that expressed above, Donald Atwater, prominent English Catholic journalist, said that the grave danger is that religious people allow themselves to be thrown by Communist violence and success into the arms of opposite parties in which Christians should not be found. Atwater went on to give the following account of Church participation in the Spanish struggle:

"... Processions of Our Lady accompanied by men triumphantly waving rifles, and 'anti-Red' militia whose uniform includes a badge of the Sacred Heart, churches used as arsenals by anti-Communist troops (all reported recently from Spain, the last by a well-known Italian Catholic)-- these are the sort of thing that give color to Communist charges against Christianity that confirm the belief that Catholics will stick at nothing to down Communism and up-

1. The New Republic, Sept. 16, 1936, p. 147.

2. The Catholic World, October 1936, pp. 101-102.

hold flagrantly unjust social and economic systems and the material possessions of the Church."¹

Richard Neville describes the activities of the clergy in Granada in support of the forces of rebellion:

"I know because I saw them, that in Granada's church towers and steeples machine guns were placed and that they were used against a civilian population. . . . I know again because I saw it with my own eyes that the churches of Granada were used as barracks for the fascist organizations and the rebel militia and I know that in at least one church in Granada--the Church of San Geronimo--considerable ammunition was stored. . . . The Archbishop at Granada had blessed companies of the Civil Guard being sent out to 'pacify' rebellious villages and the Cardinal at Seville has put his stamp of approval on the revolt by presiding at a mass in the presence of General Franco. . . ."²

That churches were being used not as churches but as Fascist fortresses, was the official explanation of the Loyalist Government when it decreed, on July 28, 1936, the enforcement of Article 26 of the Constitution of 1931, which ordered all buildings belonging to religious orders confiscated within five days, and closed all places of worship.³

The Spanish Church officially allied itself with the Insurgents and with Fascism in September 1937, when two Spanish cardinals and forty-six other prelates signed a pastoral letter which declared the revolt of General Franco to be a legitimate one. Isidoro, Cardinal Goma y Tomas, the Vatican's representative with the Insurgent regime was the first signatory of the letter which stressed the following five points:⁴

1. The Commonweal, October 2, 1936, pp. 517-518.
2. The New Republic, September 16, 1936, pp. 145-147.
3. New York Times, July 29, 1936, p. 1.
4. New York Times, September 3, 1937, p. 1.

1. The Church didn't want the war, even though thousands of sons of the Church had taken arms to save the principles of religion and Christian justice.

2. Since 1931, the legislative and executive power in Spain has changed Spanish history in a sense contrary to the needs of the national spirit.

3. The elections of 1936 were unjust. Although the Rightist-Center parties received 500,000 more votes, they received 118 fewer seats because of arbitrary annulment of votes in all the provinces.

4. The Communist International had armed a "revolutionary Spanish militia".

5. The Civil War is legitimate because five years of continued outrages of Spanish subjects in the religious and social fields had endangered the very existence of public welfare and had produced enormous spiritual unrest among the Spanish people. . . .

Late in the summer of 1937, the attitude of the Loyalist regime toward the Church became increasingly more moderate. On August 7, the Government authorized the resumption of private religious services throughout the territory under its control.¹ On August 12, it issued a decree making it an offense to molest a priest of any religion in the administration of a sacrament.² Three days later, mass was celebrated openly in the cities of Valencia and Madrid for the first time since the closing of all the Catholic Churches at the beginning of the rebellion.³

1. New York Times, August 8, 1937, p. 30.

2. New York Times, August 13, 1937, p. 11.

3. New York Times, August 16, 1937, p. 7.

According to Herbert L. Matthews, in March 1938, 2,000 masses were being held in Barcelona every day, and 3,000 priests were living peaceably in that city and administering all of the sacraments freely.¹

B. The Vatican and the Hierarchy

On July 22, 1936, an AP dispatch quoted L'Osservatore Romano, authoritative newspaper of Vatican City, as stating that the Catholic Church had interested itself in neither side of the conflict.² But three months later, in openly charging that Bolshevik propaganda had caused the Spanish Civil War, Pope Pius XI declared:

"Satanic preparation has relighted--in neighboring Spain--that hatred and savage persecution which have been confessedly reserved for the Catholic Church and Catholic religion as being the one real obstacle. . . . Those are the forces which have already given the measure of themselves in subversive attacks on every kind of order, from Russia to China and from Mexico to South America. . . ."

According to Camille Cianfarra, during the movement of Fascist and Nazi planes, troops, and equipment into Spain, L'Osservatore Romano and the Fascist press, in perfect harmony, vied with each other in publishing fearful accounts of Loyalist persecution of the clergy and the faithful.⁴

In August 1937, after the Vatican had granted the Insurgents the right to maintain informal diplomatic relations

1. New York Times, March 13, 1937, p. 6.

2. New York Times, July 23, 1936, p. 2.

3. New York Times, September 15, 1936, p. 1, 25.

4. "The Vatican and the War," p. 107.

with its Secretary of State, Pablo Churruga was sent to Rome as charge d'affaires for the Franco National Government.¹ In May of the following year, formal diplomatic relations were established between Vatican City and Burgos, and the Holy See recognized the Franco regime as the legitimate Government of Spain.²

Soon after Cardinal Pacelli, Papal Secretary of State, became Pope Pius XII, he received a congratulatory message from General Franco. In reply, the new Pope sent the following communication to the Insurgent leader, on March 9, 1939:

"Formulating auguries for new successes conforming with the glorious Catholic traditions of Spain and blessing beloved Spain, we cordially thank you for your devoted message and invoke divine assistance for your Excellency."³

There can be little doubt that the Vatican policy in support of the Spanish Church since 1931 had been one of hostility toward the Republic. From 1931 to 1936, the Church and the Vatican lined up behind any faction in Spanish politics--notably Gil Robles' Catholic Popular Action party--which promised to restore Catholicism by legal means. But when the rebellion broke out in 1936, the Vatican and the Church did not hesitate to support the forces of General Franco, which promised to restore Catholicism by the sword. The Vatican was for Franco, as George Seldes has said, because

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1. New York Times, August 4, 1937, p. 1.
 2. The Catholic World, July 1938, p. 494.
 3. New York Times, March 10, 1939, p. 1.

Franco was for the Vatican.¹

Cianfarra discusses the Vatican policy in relation to the Civil War in the following passages:

"The Papacy had been accused of supporting Fascism because the Spanish clergy sided with Franco and the Vatican gave the Insurgents its moral support during the Spanish Civil War. The Vatican never concealed its sympathies for the Spanish dictator, but it always denied that it was in favor of one ideology as against another. . . . To the Holy See, Franco represented the man who was defending the Church in Spain, and the only objective of Vatican policy. . . is that of spreading Catholicism and obtaining for its religious bodies favorable working conditions. True, this aim sometimes coincides with those of governments that are totalitarian in character, and therefore in contrast with the fundamental concepts of democracy. . . ."2

John V. Hinkel announced on August 6, 1938, that a book was ready for publication at Burgos which would indicate that Catholic ecclesiastics throughout the world were unanimously in support of the cause of the Spanish Nationalists. The book, according to this report, would contain messages of sympathy, addressed to Cardinal Goma, Primate of Spain, from nearly 900 cardinals, archbishops, and bishops concerning the persecution of the Catholic Church in Loyalist territory. With Vatican approval, it would be published as a sequel to the 1937 pastoral letter of the Spanish hierarchy, would contain letters of sympathy from collective hierarchies of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Mexico, and many other countries, and would be introduced by a foreword written in

1. The New Republic, November 9, 1938, pp. 6-9.

2. Ibid., p. 270-271.

the form of a letter to Cardinal Goma by Cardinal Pacelli, Papal Secretary of State.¹

But long before the publication of this collection of letters purporting to show that Catholics of the world were united for Franco, members of the hierarchy in Europe and America--with such exceptions as Cardinal Verdier in France and Cardinal Mundelein in the United States, had rallied to the moral cause of the Spanish Insurgents.

In attacking the Archbishop of Westminster, primate of the Roman Catholic Church in England, for his support of the Franco regime, Reinhold Niebuhr made the observation that evidently the strong condemnation of rebellion in orthodox Christianity can be easily overcome if the Church happens to be on the side of the rebels. Niebuhr said in part:

"...One might wish that revolutions were otherwise and that the passions of conflict were more restrained. But it ought to be the first task of a profound religion to deal realistically with the causes of these terrible passions. . . . We find instead the Catholic Church, wrapped in a cloak of self-righteousness, calling God's curse upon 'the heathen peoples whose trust is in their ferocity' and speaking of rebels against constitutional authority as 'the forces of Christian law and order'. The force of religion is used, in other words, exclusively to increase rather than to mitigate the natural self-deception and pretension of the human heart. . . ."2

If, as the Catholic hierarchy proclaimed to the world, the Spanish Insurgents were protecting the Church and the Catholic faith by crusading against Communism, then their

1. New York Times, August 7, 1938, p. 26.

2. The Christian Century, September 2, 1936, p. 1158.

action in persecuting the Basque clergy and the devout but fiercely independent Basques was far from being consistent with their avowed aims. Jose Antonio de Aguirre, President of the Basque Government, has stated that, as early as October 1936, the persecution of the Basque clergy by the forces of General Franco resulted in 15 priests being executed, 150 being confined in Falange prisons with sentences varying from between six years imprisonment to the death sentence. According to President Aguirre, Monsignor Mugica, Bishop of Vitoria was exiled by the Nationalists, and among others exiled and deprived of their posts were nine dignitaries of the Episcopal Tribunal, 13 professors of the seminary, six archpriests, 69 parish priests, 101 co-adjutors, 88 chaplains, and 131 monks of different orders.¹ The crime committed by these Basque Catholic clergymen was the defense of their freedom of conscience and that of their people against a Fascist tyranny which pretended to be a religious crusade.²

The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States toward the Spanish Civil War, and the very great influence it exerted over the makers of American foreign policy will be considered in Part II of this work.

1. Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question, Official Records, UN Security Council, June 1946, p. 77.

2. Ibid., p. 78.

CHAPTER V

FOREIGN INTERVENTION:
THE TOTALITARIAN STATES

Since foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil War began as soon as the rebellion broke out in Morocco on July 16, 1936, the conflict at no time could have been considered as one which was the concern of Spain and Spain alone. As soon as the totalitarian states of both the Right and the Left were convinced that Great Britain and France had officially abandoned the cause of democracy in Spain, masks were ripped off and the struggle on the Iberian Peninsula, despite the endless sham and hypocrisy of successive non-intervention proposals, became the dress rehearsal for World War II.

It was in Spain that Hitler and Mussolini first waged a war of aggression side by side. From the first to the last, the Fascist powers, despite the fact that they were members of the International Committee for the Application of the Agreement regarding Non-Intervention in Spain, provided the Insurgents with the troops, planes, and materials of war necessary for the destruction of the Spanish Republic.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union supported the Loyalist Government and its hydra-headed Leftist successor, anxious to see a Soviet Republic of Spain, or a pro-Soviet constitutional government, or at least an anti-Axis regime in control of the Iberian Peninsula.

This chapter will deal with the extent of foreign

intervention in the Spanish conflict and the reasons why this intervention was to result in an internal disorder becoming the gravest, the most significant, and the final warning to the community of nations of the impending tragedy which engulfed the world in 1939.

A. Intervention: Italy

Italy, according to some reports, intervened in the Spanish Civil War the day before Franco's forces revolted. On July 30, 1936, three Italian Savoia bombers were forced to land in French Morocco, two others crashed near Oran in Algeria, and a sixth fell near Nemours. All six bombers, each of which carried ~~ten~~ machine guns, left a military airdrome at Milan on the morning of July 27. However, the order to transport the planes to Spanish Morocco, copies of which were found on the dead aviators, had been issued by Italian military authorities on July 15.¹ A London Times correspondent stated that the flying orders for these aircraft had been issued on July 17.²

None of these planes, the pilots and crews of which were officers in the Italian Air Force, were carrying the markings prescribed in international conventions. According to Raymond Leslie Buell, the orders which sent these bombers to Spanish Morocco constituted a violation of the international air convention of 1919 and the traffic in arms convention of 1925.³

1. Paassen, Pierre van, Days of Our Years, p. 434.

2. New York Times, March 14, 1937, p. 40.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, August 7, 1936.

By late summer and early fall, Italy was entering the first stages of a full scale war of aggression against the Spanish Republic. Testifying in London before an unofficial committee backed by Labor members of Parliament, William E. Dodd, Jr., son of the United States Ambassador in Berlin, stated that, on August 20, he witnessed the unloading of a cargo of airplanes from an Italian ship which had docked at Vigo, Spain.¹ Foreign aid for Franco had been so considerable by October, that Frank L. Kluckhohn estimated the backbone of General Franco's army was by that time composed of Italian, German, and Moorish troops.² An editorial in the November 1 edition of the New York Times declared that, whether or not one agreed with Mr. Kluckhohn's conclusion, there could be no doubt that without such assistance the Rebel advances would have been seriously retarded.³

In January 1937, it was reported that 10,000 troops were being rushed to Spain to aid in Franco's next all-out offensive against Madrid.⁴ Two months later, Herbert L. Matthews quoted J. Alvarez del Vayo as estimating that at least 60,000 Italian troops were in Spain.⁵

On March 23, 1937, Count Grandi, of Italy, declared before the London Non-Intervention Committee that the Italian "volunteers" would not leave Spanish territory until General Franco had gained a complete and final victory.⁶ Nevertheless,

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1. New York Times, October 2, 1936, p.1.
 2. New York Times, October 30, 1936, p. 3.
 3. New York Times, November 1, 1936, p. E 8.
 4. New York Times, January 6, 1937, p. 1.
 5. New York Times, March 1, 1937, p. 7.
 6. Del Vayo, "Freedom's Battle," p. 46.

eight days after Grandi's statement, Signor Alfieri, Minister of Press and Propaganda, renewed assurances that the measures taken by the Non-Intervention Committee "have been and always will be respected by the Italian Government."¹

One year later, on March 30, 1938, Benito Mussolini declared before the Italian Senate that thousands of Italian officers had gained actual experience in two wars, in Abyssinia and in Spain.¹ On May 20, Il Duce wrote in *Il Popolo d'Italia*:

"We have intervened from the first to the last moment."²

On April 16, 1938, in concluding an agreement with Italy, Great Britain admitted the cruel farce of non-intervention. By this Perth-Ciano accord, which took a Franco victory for granted, Italy agreed that all "volunteers" not withdrawn from Spain by the end of the war would leave immediately after its conclusion in Franco's favor. At the same time, it was agreed that all Italian war material, hitherto considered as non-existent by the Non-Intervention Committee, would be simultaneously withdrawn.³

In an editorial in the February 7, 1939 edition of the Giornale d'Italia, Virginio Gayda stated that Italy would not withdraw her troops from Spain until General Franco had gained a complete military victory and had firmly established his political regime.⁴ On March 28, Mussolini made the follow-

1. Ibid., p. 47.

2. UN Security Council Sub-Committee Report--Spanish Question, p. 8.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, April 22, 1938.

4. New York Times, February 8, 1939, p. 15.

ing announcement of the fall of Madrid:

"General Franco's infantry and Italian legionaries have entered Madrid. Therefore the Spanish war may be regarded as finished. It has ended with the defeat of Bolshevism. All the enemies of Italy and fascism will come to the same end."¹

On the next day, an editorial in the Rome Corriere della Sera, said of Franco's triumph:

"The event will have enormous repercussions in South America and is most likely to contribute to exalting the spirits of those Spanish-speaking countries while proportionately reducing the artificial and harmful influences of the Anglo-Saxon powers."²

Although the Spanish Civil War had been declared at an end on April 1, 1939, the Italian Government reneged on its pledge in the Perth-Ciano accord of the previous year and postponed the withdrawal of troops and materials to May 15, the date set for General Franco's triumphant march into Madrid.³

After three years of war and after three years of "respectfully complying" with the Non-Intervention Agreement, the Italian Government, through an article published in the official Forze Armate, disclosed the extent of its aid to the Spanish Insurgents. This article revealed that, in the months from December 1936 to April 1937 alone, the Italian Navy transported 100,000 men, 4,370 motor vehicles, 40,000 tons of munitions, and 750 cannon to Spain. According to the admission of this official organ, after November 1, 1936, Italian

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1. New York Times, March 29, 1939, p. 1.
 2. New York Times, March 30, 1939, p. 5.
 3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, April 21, 1939.

submarines torpedoed commercial shipping bound for Loyalist ports and were responsible for creating the piracy menace which resulted in the calling of the Nyon Conference in September 1937.¹

In disclosing that over 6,000 Italian military aviators operating Italian machines eventually saw service in Spain, Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, stated in the Fascist periodical, Gerarchia, that Italy's intervention in the Civil War began on July 25, 1936, when that Government sent its first nine bombers to Spanish Morocco.²

B. Intervention: Germany

There seems to be little doubt that Nazi Germany not only was aware of the conspiracy against the Spanish Republic, but had given assurances of aid to the Insurgents even before the revolt began. On July 15, 1936, the day before the Civil War broke out, Volkischer Beobachter, official organ of the German Government, prophesized the rebellion in the following words:

"... it will not be the first time in the course of these twenty years, that the summer holidays in Spain are interrupted by grave political surprises."³

Germany's first official act of intervention occurred in mid-July when Adolf Hitler placed a Deutsche Lufthansa plane at General Franco's disposal for the latter's historic

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, June 16, 1939.

2. Ibid.

3. Del Vayo, op. cit., p. 51.

flight from the Canary Islands to Tetuan, which was destined to be the signal for the opening of hostilities.¹

Nazi military and material aid to Franco began at the beginning of August 1936. On the 11th day of that month, Frank L. Kluckhohn reported the arrival at Rebel headquarters in Seville of 20 heavy German Junker bombers and five German pursuit planes, all manned by German military pilots.²

Herbert L. Matthews, in commenting on the extent of German aid to the Rebels, said in December 1936:

"... but on the general proposition that German soldiers and technicians are helping General Francisco Franco, Rebel leader, we could not be wrong. Today there is talk of 20,000 Reichswehr troops in all having been landed at Cadiz."³

William E. Dodd, Jr. declared in London⁴ that on September 24, 1936, he saw 15 fully-armed men go ashore from a German ship at Vigo, Spain.⁵ Kluckhohn reported in October 1936 that the new rifles and machine guns being unloaded at Vigo and other ports were being shipped from Hamburg.⁶

By January 1937, it was estimated that there were 14,000 Germans in Spain.⁷

The official Nazi admission that "volunteers" from the Third Reich were fighting in Spain came in the form of an

1. UN Security Council Sub-Committee Report--Spanish Question, p. 7.

2. New York Times, August 12, 1936, p. 1.

3. New York Times, December 27, 1936, p. E 4.

4. See p. 86.

5. New York Times, October 2, 1936, p. 1.

6. New York Times, October 30, 1936, p. 3.

7. New York Times, January 6, 1937, p. 1.

article by Count Ciano in Wille Und Macht, German Youth periodical, in which the Italian Foreign Minister highly praised the German aid to Burgos.¹

On February 23, 1939, the following telegram from General Franco to Adolf Hitler was published in Berlin:

"When, after the conclusion of the campaign in Catalonia, victorious troops marched into Barcelona, heroic German volunteers were among them, and in hailing them the Spanish people hailed Germany and its Fuehrer. . . ."²

Two months after Franco's victory, Nazi Germany, which had been repeatedly absolved of all charges of intervention by the London Non-Intervention Committee, displayed the utmost contempt for the "decadent" democracies by officially admitting the following violations of international law and the Non-Intervention Agreement: On July 20, 1936, some 20 Lufthansa transport planes had begun to ferry 15,000 Moorish troops to the Spanish mainland. Eleven days later, the first group of German aviation personnel, disguised as tourists, left Hamburg for Spain in German ships which also carried military aircraft, bombs, and anti-aircraft guns. In September, pursuit and observation squadrons, a battery of heavy anti-aircraft artillery and two tank companies landed in Spain. Late in the next month, a complete air corps of 6,500 men had been sent to the Iberian Peninsula. Nazi sea, air, and land forces, commanded by regular officers, according to Berlin,

1. New York Times, February 24, 1939, p. 3.

2. Ibid.

saw action on every Spanish front. In addition to this direct participation in the conflict, the Germans conducted tank, anti-tank, communications, and flame-throwing schools, as well as a training school for 56,000 Spanish officers.¹

After openly and boastfully admitting that German troops, not volunteers but regular members of the armed forces, were sent to Spain for periods of training in actual warfare, official Germany prepared to welcome the vanguard of those mighty legions which were soon to sweep across Europe. On June 6, 1939, in Berlin, 15,000 German veterans of the Condor Legion, and 2,500 German sailors passed before Chancellor Hitler, and received their Fuehrer's praise for a job well done in Spain.²

C. Intervention: Portugal

Hostile to the Spanish Republic since the abdication of Alfonso XIII in 1931, the Fascist dictatorship in Portugal was, from the first days of the Civil War, a willing accomplice in the death of constitutional government in Spain.

When the London Non-Intervention Committee first proposed an arms embargo against both factions in the Spanish conflict, there seemed little doubt in August 1936 that such a policy would prove to the great advantage of the Republican forces in the long run. In addition to a gold reserve of

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, June 16, 1939.

2. Ibid.

\$700,000,000, the Loyalist Government controlled the country's two most important industrial centers, Madrid and Barcelona, while the Insurgents were forced to depend to a considerable degree on foreign supplies and arms.¹

After having refused previously to commit herself on proposals which would ban arms shipments to the theater of war and patrol the borders and coasts of Spain to enforce the embargo, Portugal stayed away from the first meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee which was held on September 9, 1936.² At about this time, according to the report of New York Times correspondent Frank L. Kluckhohn, although there was no evidence that arms and materials of war were being sent to the Spanish Insurgents, ships of nations favoring the Rebel cause had been arriving in Portuguese harbors in large numbers, and caravans were being sent off toward the Spanish frontier bearing "unknown products carefully covered by sheets of canvas."³

The New Republic, in an editorial commenting upon the attitude of Portugal and the non-intervention proposals, declared:

"The situation calls for a thorough and prompt investigation. Portugal is supposed to be under British diplomatic influence; one wonders whether the Foreign Office is disposed to wink at what is going on there, in spite of the fact that Great Britain was one of the most ardent advocates of the non-intervention agreement. . . . International law and custom made it perfectly proper to aid the Spanish government while denying help to the rebels. This would have been the normal procedure. . . . Why should not an interna-

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1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, August 28, 1936.
 2. New York Times, September 10, 1936, p. 20.
 3. The New Republic, September 30, 1936, p. 212-213.

tional police force examine all shipments to Spain, whether through Portugal or France or the Atlantic and Mediterranean ports. Surely Portugal is not in a position to object, France would not do so, and neither Germany nor Italy could with good faith refuse to allow their ships to be searched by an international force charged with the duty of carrying out a pledge that they had made. . . ."¹

In London, William E. Dodd, Jr. stated² that while on a holiday trip to Lisbon on September 18, 1936, he observed that a large number of armaments firms' representatives were staying in the Portuguese capital. From talking with two Englishmen, Dodd said he discovered that Vickers arms were being bought in Portugal, but being sent directly to the Insurgents in Spain.³

Del Vayo charges that the Portuguese frontier authorities were not content with permitting munitions lorries to be loaded in Portuguese ports and sent without delay through Portuguese territory to the Rebels, but that these same frontier authorities, other than internment all Republican forces attempting to fall back into Portugal, handed them over to the Insurgents.⁴

Of the reasons why Britain, whose influence was paramount in Portugal, should have allowed her ally of nearly 300 years to help make the Non-Intervention Agreement one of the basest farces in modern history, Anne O'Hare McCormick said:

1. Ibid.

2. See p. 86.

3. New York Times, October 2, 1936, p.1.

4. Ibid., p. 30.

"The impression prevails in official circles that in the Spanish affair British and Portuguese interests are in harmony. It is thought that Britain, while striving by every means to keep the fire from spreading does not desire to see Spain under Russian tutelage and desires still less to see her Portuguese ally swallowed up in a sovietized, syndicalized or anarchistic Iberian union. . . ."1

On January 20, 1937, Portugal formally notified Great Britain that she was unwilling to accept the international arms supervisory plan, and gave an indication that she would not allow an international naval patrol off her coast.² One month later, when France accepted supervision of the Pyrenees frontier and Britain accepted supervision of the Gibraltar frontier, Portugal persisted in her refusal to allow any international supervision within her territory.

On August 19, 1937, the Portuguese Government broke off diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, when officials at Prague had refused to permit the export of machine guns ordered from a government-controlled Czechoslovak factory. Czechoslovakia's refusal was based on its obligation under the Non-Intervention Agreement not to supply either side with the materials or munitions of war, directly or indirectly.³

D. Intervention: Russia

How large a share of the responsibility for the Spanish tragedy--if any--must fall on the shoulders of the Soviet Union? And what role did Moscow and the Communist

1. New York Times, January 19, 1937, p. 13.

2. New York Times, January 21, 1937, p. 8.

Third International play in the Spanish conflict? Nearly every correspondent, international observer, author, politician, or churchman lecturing or writing on the Spanish Civil War has given answers to these questions. But not all of the answers have been the same.

Many Franco sympathizers and many objective observers have attempted to justify the Spanish rebellion by arguing that, once the Republic was established in 1931, the forces of the extreme Left immediately began their preparations for a social revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat, with the behind-the-scenes assistance of Moscow.

Soviet influence first made its appearance on the Spanish political scene in 1927, but although the Kremlin and the Third International had been keeping a close watch on trends in Spain, this influence seems to have been negligible. After 1931, the Russian plan, according to Lawrence A. Fernsworth, seems to have been to assume a passive attitude toward democracy in Spain, which provided a bulwark against Fascism, and at the same time allowed free reign to the revolutionary activity of the extreme Left. Fernsworth says that in 1936 more than 100 Spanish Communists who had taken refuge in Russia after the Revolution of 1934 had failed, returned to their native land well versed in Soviet revolutionary tactics and concepts, and ready to put their theory into practice.¹

Michael Williams, editor of The Commonweal, claims

1. Foreign Affairs, July 1936, p. 665.

that the Insurgents were in possession of positive evidence that a Red plot was being hatched which would replace constitutional government with the proletarian dictatorship, liquidate all members of the Catholic and Right-wing parties, and wipe out the clergy, the nuns, and all others suspected of having any affiliation with or sympathy for Catholicism, conservatism, or even Catholic liberalism.¹

Gerald Brennan says of the alleged Communist plot to establish a Soviet Republic of Spain in 1936:

"One may dismiss the story that they were planning a revolution for that autumn as Fascist propaganda. A revolution would have alienated the Western Democracies whom Stalin was courting at this time. It would have put Largo Caballero and the Socialists into power. The Communist policy this spring was simply to take advantage of the revolutionary situation to increase their own influence and following. They would thus be in a position whatever happened to influence events."²

The Right-wing extremists could not charge the Soviet Embassy with being implicated in the alleged Red plot to overthrow the Spanish Republic because, as del Vayo maintains:

". . . for there had been no Soviet Ambassador in Spain, nor had there ever been one since the Russian Revolution. When the rebellion broke out, Republican Spain was maintaining normal diplomatic relations with every country except the U.S.S.R. The Republic did not recognize Soviet Russia until 1933³. . . . The first Soviet Ambassador did not arrive in Spain until the end of August 1936, after the outbreak of the rebellion."⁴

1. The Commonweal, May 7, 1937, pp. 33-37.

2. Ibid., p. 307.

3. Ibid., p. 18.

4. Ibid., p. 19.

Soviet intervention in the Civil War began in September 1936 when a Russian General Staff, headed by General Goriev, first sat in on the sessions of the Loyalist War Office, over which it soon exerted a great influence.¹ By October 29, the Loyalists were using Russian tanks and artillery,² and on November 11, the first Russian plane saw action.³

Although Russia did not, as did Germany and Italy, send complete combat units to Spain, the Russian General Staff did organize the international brigades into very effective fighting units. In discussing this international support for the Spanish Republic, Herbert L. Matthews said:

" . . . An important factor is an international column which is formed from volunteers from the four corners of the world who have come here to fight for their ideals. Some of them are Communists, others are Socialists, Liberals, and Democrats, but they all have one thing in common-- they are anti-Fascist. . . ."⁴

De Madariaga states that the contingent of Soviet technical experts which saw service in Spain, has been estimated at about 6,000 men, but that no more than 500 were there at a time.⁵

While Dr. Juan Negrin was Minister of Finance, on October 25, 1936, 7,800 boxes of gold were shipped from Cartagena, Spain to Odessa, Russia.⁶ On December 21, 1936, a letter to Largo Caballero signed by Stalin, Molotov, and Voro-

1. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 384.

2. Ibid., p. 383.

3. Del Vayo, op. cit., p. 65.

4. New York Times, December 27, 1936, p. E 4.

5. Ibid., p. 386.

6. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 392.

shilov, was taken to Spain by Marcel Rosenberg, Soviet Ambassador.¹ And on January 1, 1937, the following New Year's greeting from Premier Largo Caballero to the U.S.S.R. was published in Izvestia:

" . . . The Spanish working class is forever united with the Russian workers. We will never forget the solidarity of the Soviet workers with us in this difficult time. The proletariat of Spain will always strive during the war and after the war is over to follow the example of your great country."²

De Madariaga contends that the Soviet Union increased or reduced its supplies to the Loyalists accordingly as the Government changed its attitude toward Communists and Communist-sympathizers. When Indalecio Prieto, who shared power with Negrin, removed J. Alvarez del Vayo from the post of political commissar of the Army, abolished the system of commissars, and prohibited political propaganda in the Army, the Russians drastically cut shipments of arms and supplies to Republican Spain.³

Much of the abuse heaped upon the Loyalist Government was undoubtedly due to the support and aid which it accepted from the Soviet Union. But, despite the ulterior motives which may have been behind Moscow's action in aiding Madrid, the fact cannot be ignored that the U.S.S.R. was merely reverting to a normal practice under international law of selling arms to a legitimate government.

1. Ibid., p. 390.

2. New York Times, January 2, 1937, p. 2.

3. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 397.

In May 1939, after the fall of the Republic, Negrin attempted to explain the Loyalist dependence upon the Soviet Union before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. The Premier in exile said:

"Of course we bought from Russia what, had the democracies observed international law and protected their national interests, we should have been able to buy from the United States, France, and England. Would you have asked us to refuse Russian arms when we could not get arms anywhere else?"¹

1. Del Vayo, op. cit., p. 76.

CHAPTER VI

NON-INTERVENTION: THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

By following an official policy of strict non-intervention, France and Great Britain were just as responsible for the final defeat of the Spanish Republic as were the Axis Powers in following their policy of direct intervention.

World War II did not become inevitable when the Western Democracies adopted their non-intervention policy in regard to the Spanish conflict. It did become inevitable when France and Great Britain refused to face the fact that their pusillanimous policy of peace at any price had made of the Non-Intervention Agreement a spectacle of nauseating hypocrisy and transparent dishonesty.

Though the cause of constitutional government was succumbing to the attack of the Left-extremists as well as the extremists of the Right once the Civil War had begun, Spain gave the Democracies their last chance to make a stand in support of their own cause. When London and Paris chose to continue their retreat, when they chose a policy of one-way neutrality, they accepted war and their own ruin as the future.

A. France

1. Official Non-Intervention

On July 24, 1936, the New York Times reported that it was understood in Paris that Premier Leon Blum and Foreign

Minister Yvon von Delbos had indicated a willingness to authorize exports of arms to the Spanish Government.¹ Two days later, Jules Sauerwein, Foreign Editor of the Paris-Soir, stated that at least four countries were taking an active interest in the Spanish struggle, with Britain, Germany, and Italy each giving "discreet" but effective assistance to the Insurgents, while France was supporting the Madrid Government.²

On August 1, the Quai d'Orsay announced that, in view of the attitude of certain other powers, France reserved the right to sell arms to the Spanish Republic. At the same time, it was indicated that France had as yet not permitted war materials to enter Spain even in fulfillment of contracts entered into prior to the outbreak of the rebellion.³ But later on the same day, Premier Blum made an appeal to all Powers to adopt "common rules of non-intervention."⁴

Del Vayo quotes Pertinax (Andre Geraud) as stating that the non-intervention proposal of the French Premier had its origin in a communication from London to Paris in which Great Britain informed the French Government that she would no longer guarantee to maintain the frontiers of France if independent French action were taken in Spain.⁵ Del Vayo, in further explaining his allegation, says:

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1. New York Times, July 24, 1936, p. 3.
 2. New York Times, July 26, 1936, p. 2.
 3. New York Times, August 2, 1936, p. 1.
 4. F. L. Schuman, International Politics, p. 596.
 5. Ibid., p. 68.

"The British warning. . . was conveyed to M. Yvon Delbos, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a visit by Sir George Clerk, the British Ambassador to Paris. Sir George is understood to have said that if France should find herself in conflict with Germany as a result of having sold war material to the Spanish Government, England would consider herself released from her obligations under the Locarno Pact and would not come to help."¹

When Premier Blum's official proposal that non-intervention be applied to Spain was accepted, within a few days, by all the major countries of Europe, Edwin L. James optimistically predicted that the danger of the Civil War involving Old World nations with divergent political philosophies would certainly grow less.² An editorial in The New Republic, however, had a much less optimistic tone:

". . . France hesitated, Britain sat on both sides of the fence, while Germany and Italy were rushing airplanes and tanks to the rebels. The fascist nations bullied the democratic nations into regarding the military revolt as a genuine civil war. . . . At present Premier Blum's policy of shipping arms to neither side is the soundest and wisest possible, on the assumption that all the powers can be brought to respect it. No development in any one country, no matter how disastrous, is worth a European war. . . ."³

After 16 months of non-intervention, John C. DeWilde, in reporting that the French were becoming increasingly impatient with the constant failure of the London Committee's proposals, said:

1. Ibid., p. 68.

2. New York Times, August 9, 1936, p. E 3.

3. The New Republic, September 9, 1936, pp. 117-118.

"While London is apparently preparing to abandon the Spanish Loyalists to Franco, a recent congress of the French Radical Socialist party of which Chautemps [Premier] and Delbos [Foreign Minister] are members, manifested a strong desire to have non-intervention in Spain either terminated or strictly enforced. . . ."¹

2. Unofficial Aid to Madrid

There seems to be little doubt that the sympathies of the great majority of Frenchmen were, in regard to the Spanish Civil War, strongly pro-Madrid and very much pro-Spanish Popular Front. P. J. Philip, reporting on this sentiment from Paris, declared:

"It was as much in an effort to secure neutrality within his own Cabinet and the country as internationally that Premier Blum, on the advice of Foreign Minister Delbos, launched the appeal for a non-intervention pact. But so far he has not succeeded either abroad or at home. Every morning the newspapers in Paris show markedly how partisan sentiment has become."²

De Madariaga says that the first impulse of the French Government was to aid the Spanish Republic, and that she would have done so if the Civil War had not suddenly transformed itself into a social revolution vs. a military rebellion, and if France had been better prepared in a military sense to risk a European adventure of much greater magnitude.³

But, if France did not give official aid to Republican Spain, she did not go out of her way to discourage unoffi-

1. Foreign Policy Bulletins, December 3, 1937.

2. New York Times, August 23, 1936, p. E 3.

3. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 385.

cial aid to Madrid. In August 1936, Frenchmen were permitted to fight in the Civil War provided they carried regular passports.¹

The International Brigades were formed in France with the implied approval of the Government, the first one saving Madrid during Franco's first drive on the capital, and the second brigade reaching the front on November 14, 1936.²

Private citizens of France aided the Loyalist cause in many different ways. Andre Malraux, for example, purchased aircraft abroad, and recruited a French Foreign Legion of the Air which fought for the Madrid Government.³

B. Great Britain

1. British Opinion and the Civil War

Although a majority of the British people favored the cause of constitutional government in Spain, the Spanish Rebels found many sympathizers among influential religious and social groups and among powerful business interests in Great Britain.

Ferdinand Kuhn Jr., in October 1936, reported that there was a passionate pro-Madrid feeling among the British working people, which found vigorous expression in Labor and Liberal newspapers throughout the country.³ The British Labor Party, speaking for a considerable section of the country's professional class as well as for the great mass of workers,

1. New York Times, August 2, 1936, p. 1.

2. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 386.

3. New York Times, October 11, 1936, p. E 5.

from the first, vigorously opposed the Government's foreign policy on Spain. On October 5, the Annual Conference of the Labor Party at Edinburgh repudiated the action taken by the British Trade Union Congress on September 10, when it endorsed the policy of non-intervention. At its conference, the Labor Party voted to oppose the Government's foreign policy as a whole.¹

On October 29, Arthur Greenwood, Laborite spokesman, in demanding that the Government permit the sale of arms and munitions to Madrid declared:

"Spain has now become a pawn in the game of power and politics. The Spanish revolt is not a spontaneous rising of an oppressed people. It is a carefully engineered conspiracy, originated outside Spain and aided and abetted by powers outside of Spain."²

Herbert Morrison, President of the London City Council, stated, on March 30, 1937, that Great Britain, France and the United States were equally to blame for failing to provide the legitimate government with the materials of war which would have enabled the Loyalists to end the conflict a few months after it had begun.³

In an address before the House of Commons on January 31, 1939, Clement Atlee attacked the Government's futile policy of non-intervention in the following words:

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1. Foreign Affairs, July 1937, p. 667.
 2. New York Times, October 30, 1936, p. 2.
 3. New York Times, March 31, 1937, p. 7.

"Ever since it has been found that non-intervention is a sham, we have demanded that the Spanish Government shall be given their rights under international law. The Government has steadily refused, always on the one basis that without non-intervention there may be a widening of the struggle that may lead to a general European conflict. . . . The strategic position of Britain has been worsened year by year. An independent Spain is vital to the safety of France and Britain. The resistance in Spain has warded off a crisis which might come to us, and all the time we played the ignominious part of holding the hands of Spain while she was attacked by an aggressor and preventing her from defending herself. . . ."1

The most influential of the pro-Franco groups in England were the hierarchy and many members of the Catholic Church, the powerful business and financial interests, and many members of Britain's aristocracy.

The Roman Catholic Church in England, profoundly shocked by the anti-religious excesses alleged to have been committed by the Republican forces in Spain, according to Kuhn, so influenced opinion in Britain that many thousands of peaceful, middle-class Catholics, especially in the northern shires, were fervently praying for a Rebel victory.²

As was to be expected, business opinion in Britain was strongly pro-Franco, and the conservative press, especially the Rothermere papers, outdid itself in sensational reporting of Loyalist atrocities while acclaiming the Insurgents as "Christian patriots."³

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1. New York Times, February 1, 1939, p. 10.
 2. New York Times, October 11, 1936, p. E 5.
 3. Ibid.

D. Graham Hutton, in explaining the strong pro-Rebel feeling among the conservative groups in England, said:

"Those on the extreme Right, a small but vocal minority, showed a narrow, class conception of British interests. It sufficed for them that France had just elected a Front Populaire Government, that the legitimate Spanish Government was called Frente Popular, that Communists were supporting both, and that men of property were supporting General Franco. The nineteen-year-old bogey of Bolshevism in France, in Spain, in Czechoslovakia--was evoked by the astute Propaganda Ministries of Italy and Rome for the special purpose of impressing the British Conservatives."¹

When Harold Nicolson, Labor Member of Parliament, attempted to show how deeply Britain's material interests lay with the Loyalists, he received the following answer from a Conservative Member of Parliament, Commander R. T. Bower--an answer which was typical of the conservative and aristocratic mentality during this period:

"The real causes of our dislike of the Spanish government and what it stands for go beyond consideration of the purely material interests of Britain. The foul cancerous disease of the Russian soul known as communism. . . is the deadliest enemy of our very civilization. Before its threat the hypothetical dangers of a Franco victory sink into comparative insignificance. . . . The average conservative has one thing in common with them [the fascist dictators]. . . a loathing of that bestial creed of communism."²

2. Official Non-Intervention

On August 4, 1936, the British Government officially

1. Foreign Affairs, July 1937, p. 663.

2. Straight, M., "Make This the Last War," p. 57.

accented the proposal¹ of French Premier Leon Blum that a rigid policy of non-intervention be immediately adopted and observed in regard to the Spanish situation. Eleven days later, official London announced:

"It should be realized that the maintenance of a strict and impartial attitude of non-intervention is essential if the unhappy events in Spain are to be prevented from having serious repercussions elsewhere."²

Augur, reporting from London to the New York Times, said of the British attitude:

"The British Government sincerely favors neutrality in the conflict, although, looking beneath the surface, it is impossible to discover in political and business circles here any sign of sympathy with Madrid. . . ."³

At about this time, the Government warned British subjects that all who tried to aid either side in Spain would receive no official support whatever in any difficulties they might encounter. Noting this official view, D. Graham Hutton said that such a drastic denial of aid, even through private citizens, to the legitimate government of a friendly power engaged in a struggle to suppress "freebooters" whom none of the democratic governments would recognize as belligerents, inevitably led to charges that non-intervention was only a smoke screen behind which the Spanish Insurgents were being favored by the Fascist and democratic regimes alike.⁴

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1. See p. 98 for alleged story behind this proposal.
 2. Foreign Affairs, July 1937, p. 666.
 3. New York Times, August 17, 1936, p. 3.
 4. Foreign Affairs, July 1937, p. 666.

Sir Samuel Hoare, speaking for official London, said in mid-August 1936 that the British Government would not think of intervening in the Spanish struggle, even if asked to do so. But at the same time, Hoare implied that Britain might be willing to take part in mediating the conflict.¹ On December 19, Edwin L. James reported that Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had proposed that Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia attempt to mediate in Spain, but that nothing further had happened although the proposal was apparently well received in the capitals involved.²

Foreign Secretary Eden stated before the House of Commons on March 3, 1937, that Britain was constantly considering the question as to whether steps could be taken to provide a basis for negotiation between the factions in Spain. He regretted to say that neither the Loyalists nor the Nationalists gave an indication that they were willing to consider mediation.³

In discussing the Foreign Secretary's statement, de Madariaga says that Mr. Eden neglected to say that "neither party" was Spain. The real Spain, according to this author, had been longing for mediation all the time. When Dr. Julian Besteiro was sent to London to represent Spain at the Coronation in May 1937, President Azana entrusted him with a peace

1. New York Times, August 21, 1936, p. 14.

2. New York Times, December 20, 1936, p. E 3.

3. Vol. 321, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, p.

proposal to put before the British Government. Mr. Eden did not even bother to send a reply to the President of the Spanish Republic.¹

Reports, often supported by conclusive evidence, of Fascist and Nazi intervention in Spain were continually being placed before the Non-Intervention Committee and the British Government. But more often than not, when the subject was debated on the floor of the House of Commons, and embarrassing questions were put to spokesmen for the Foreign Office, they were parried with the terse reply: "His Majesty's Government has no information."

When on December 7, 1936, he was asked in the House of Commons whether he had any information concerning the arrival of between 2,000 and 6,000 fully equipped German nationalists at Cadiz, Eden admitted that the British Government had received information concerning the landing of 5,000 Germans at Cadiz and Seville, and said:

"As I have previously indicated to the House, His Majesty's Government strongly deprecates the participation of volunteers from other countries in the fighting in Spain."²

On January 19, 1937, the British Foreign Secretary made the following statement on the policy of His Majesty's Government toward Spain:

1. Ibid., p. 409.

2. Vol. 318, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, p. 1618.

"Though the conflict continues with unabated bitterness, the risk of its involving Europe in a war, though not yet wholly removed has been definitely diminished. Intervention in the Spanish Civil War may, and I am afraid will, prolong the horrors of that war and increase the sufferings of the unhappy Spanish people. For that reason, and others, we have been from the first opposed to it, and are still so. . . but, unless the whole past history of Spain is belied in this conflict, the great mass of the proud Spanish people will feel the least ill will to those nations which have intervened the least. If we take the long view--and in an issue of this kind it is the long view that counts--intervention in Spain is not only bad humanity, it is bad politics. . . . None the less we have our own national interests. What are they in this conflict? . . . The form of government in Spain should be a matter for the Spanish people, and no one else. It is for that reason that we have discouraged, and shall continue to discourage, outside intervention in her internal affairs. . . ."1

When the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was asked, on February 15, whether, since Italy's military aid to the Insurgents constituted a violation of international law and the obligation of one member of the League of Nations not to commit aggression against the political independence of another member, he was prepared to recommend to the League that action should be taken regarding the Spanish conflict under Article 10 of the Covenant, Viscount Cranborne replied:

"So far as I am aware there is nothing to substantiate the suggestion that any attempt is being made to alienate the territorial integrity or political independence of Spain. The last part of the question does not, therefore, arise."2

1. Vol. 319, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, pp.

2. Vol. 320, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, p.

As the Civil War continued, it became increasingly evident that the sham of non-intervention had succeeded only in making a mockery of international law, order, and justice. But, despite the obvious folly and great danger inherent in the British policy, official London, which in 1936 had begun muddling down the right-center lane of the road of appeasement, now seemed to incline more and more toward the path on the extreme right.

A letter to the London County Council Motor Licensing Department from the Foreign Office, dated March 4, 1938, in which the Insurgents were referred to as the Spanish Nationalist Government, stated that the Duke of Alba and his staff had been regarded officially as diplomats in all but name. During a debate on foreign policy on April 4, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was asked why Parliament had not been informed of this step towards the recognition of General Franco, but gave no satisfactory answer.¹

At about the same time, it was revealed that the Duke of Alba had been actually passing information on to the Prime Minister regarding the alleged arrival of foreign troops for the assistance of the legitimate government of Spain.²

When Mr. Arthur Henderson asked the Government whether it had received information of the establishment of an

1. Vol. 334, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, p.4.
2. Ibid., p. 12.

Italian air base at Palma, Majorca, and of a German air base at Pollensa, Majorca, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared that no useful purpose would be served by putting the matter before the Non-Intervention Committee since no scheme of control for observing the arrival of foreign aircraft in Spain had been agreed upon or put in force.¹

During the debate of April 4, Prime Minister Chamberlain, in giving his reasons for refusing to change His Majesty's Government's foreign policy on Spain, said:

" . . . If you remove the embargo on the supply of arms, it is bound at once to be followed by a whole flood of arms and ammunition and men pouring into Spain from the sympathizers of each side. It would not stop there. It would very soon extend to the sea, and you would have sinkings of ships, you would have drowning of troops, you would perhaps have naval battles; and the European war would have begun. That, in my opinion, and in the opinion of my colleagues, would be the result of the abandonment of non-intervention in Spain, and we have no intention of changing our policy in that respect. . . ."2

Two days later, when the Duchess of Atholl asked the Government whether it was aware that 32 German steamers had landed war material in ports under the control of Spanish Insurgents between January 2, 1938 and March 14, 1938, and that 27 Italian ships bringing arms and munitions to the Rebel forces had entered Spanish ports from February 21, 1938 to March 14, 1938, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs de-

1. Vol. 334, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, p.3.
 2. Ibid., p. 62.

clared that no information had been received by His Majesty's Government.¹

Britain moved even further to the Right on November 2, 1938, when the House of Commons ratified, by a vote of 345 to 138, the Perth-Ciano accord of April 16, which took a Franco victory for granted and at the same time admitted the farce of non-intervention. Only a few hours before the vote was taken, a Spanish Insurgent warship shelled and sank a British-chartered Spanish freighter ten miles off the Norfolk coast. Yet, Prime Minister Chamberlain could, with satisfaction, declare that the Spanish Civil War no longer threatened the peace of the world.²

On January 27, 1939, James Frederick Green reported that Britain's willingness to accept an Insurgent victory was based on the belief that Franco's conservatism would safeguard investments and trade, that the nationalism of the Insurgents and their supporters wouldn't tolerate permanent occupation by the Germans and the Italians, and that the Franco regime would need British financial assistance.³

The Nationalist Government of General Franco was unconditionally recognized by the Chamberlain ministry on February 27, 1939, and on the following day, by a vote of 344 to 137, the House of Commons upheld the action of the Government.⁴

1. Ibid., p. 359.

2. New York Times, November 3, 1938, p. 1.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, January 27, 1939.

4. New York Times, February 28, 1939, p. 1.

3. Unofficial Aid to Burgos

It would not be too great an exaggeration to state bluntly that Great Britain, to a considerable degree, financed the rebellion of General Franco.

Ferdinand Kuhn Jr., in attempting to explain how the Spanish Rebels could go on fighting for a period of nine months with no foreign loans to speak of, and without an adequate gold reserve, declared in April 1937:

"The truth is that Britain, with her great volume of imports and her growing purchasing power, is inadvertently one of the most important single factors in financing General Francisco Franco's campaign. . . . Without exports to Britain from his territory, it is thought here, the Rebel leader could not go on, no matter how much war material he might continue to receive from his German, Italian, and Portuguese friends."¹

The sale of sherry and oranges to Britain, according to Kuhn, were only a shade less than one year previously when there was no civil war. From August 1936 to February 1937, 1,300,000 pound sterling of oranges were bought for cash, and in the six months prior to April 1937, 1,020,000 pound sterling of wine was purchased by Britain.²

The New York Times, in February 1937, estimated that the British investment in Spain was equal to about 30,000,000 pound sterling, and was distributed equally in Rebel and Loyalist-controlled territory. Of this total, 10,000,000 pound

1. New York Times, April 10, 1937, p. 8.

2. Ibid.

sterling was invested in the British-owned Rio Tinto mines and other ore-extracting properties which were confiscated by the Insurgents to pay Germany for the military assistance rendered by the Nazis.¹

Lansing Warren reported in September 1937 that British financiers, who controlled 53.9 percent of the total foreign investment in Spain, were actively collaborating with wealthy Spaniards of monarchist sympathies.²

Perhaps the most significant financial aid received by the Rebels was the result of shrewd financial manipulation involving the Rio Tinto Co., Ltd. of London. During the year 1937, according to the New York Times, 1,250,000 pound sterling passed from this British-owned mining company to the Franco regime in exchange for payment in paper money at the fixed rate of 42 pesetas to the pound. These sterling payments, deposited according to the value of the products exported from Spain to Britain, enabled the Insurgents to obtain sufficient foreign credits to make 90-day cash payments on purchases of oil from the United States, as well as buy the much needed supplies of foodstuffs and materials of war. During 1937, the Rio Tinto mines, states this article, exported a larger supply of pyrites to Great Britain than in any previous period. And with each increase in exports came an increase in the foreign credits of the Insurgents.³

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1. New York Times, February 5, 1937, p. 6.
 2. New York Times, September 19, 1937, p. E 5.
 3. New York Times, January 17, 1938, p. 7.

But unofficial aid to Burgos from Britain and from British subjects was not only financial. On May 5, 1938, Spanish Insurgents and members of the aristocracy met with a number of Gibraltar's most prominent residents. At this meeting, Mrs. John Mackintosh, wife of Gibraltar's wealthiest business man, was elected president of a committee which resolved to collect funds and materials in order to supply luxuries to General Franco's forces on the various battle fronts.¹

Great Britain aided or attempted to aid the cause of the Rebels in many different ways. When the Insurgents interfered with British shipping proceeding to Bilbao in March 1937, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin announced, on April 12, that due to the danger from mines, aerial bombing, and interception by Insurgent warships, British food ships had been instructed not to proceed to Bilbao.² By attempting to renounce British maritime rights, the Baldwin ministry, through intent or through ineptitude, was aiding the Rebel effort to starve out the population of the Loyalist port.

After two heated debates in the House of Commons, the Government finally agreed that any British vessels which carried non-prohibited cargo could claim full protection of the Royal Navy beyond the three-mile limit.³

The British policy of non-intervention, appeasement,

1. New York Times, May 6, 1938, p. 5.

2. Foreign Affairs, July 1937, pp. 667-670.

3. Ibid., p. 670.

and finally retreat in Spain did not even gain Britain the thanks of the Insurgents or of their Fascist and Nazi allies. On the contrary, as the London approach to the problem became more pusillanimous, the German and Italian violations of international law became more flagrant and more open. And as the war continued, attacks upon British shipping became more daring.

On January 31, 1938, the British freighter, Endymion, was hit by a torpedo off Cartagena, and three British lives were lost. On February 5, an Italian plane carrying the Insurgent insignia bombed and sunk the British vessel, Alcira, en route to Barcelona with a cargo of coal.¹ On May 8, the British destroyer, Grafton, intercepted two Insurgent armed trawlers which were preparing to attack the British tanker, Refast. On the same day, 400 British merchant seamen marched in a body to the Foreign Office to protest against the "ruthless and absolutely deliberate" attack on British vessels in Spanish waters, and to demand that the Government take action to correct the situation immediately.²

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, February 11, 1938.

2. New York Times, May 9, 1938, p. 6.

CHAPTER VII

NON-INTERVENTION:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The International Committee for the Application of the Agreement regarding Non-Intervention in Spain was the chief means through which the Western Democracies, unwittingly or otherwise, aided and abetted the Fascist assault upon the Spanish Republic. This chapter will briefly review the more significant steps taken by, and the practical effects of, the activities of this Committee, as well as the League of Nations, which determined not only the course of the Civil War in Spain, but also the international trend toward disaster which culminated in the world tragedy of 1939-1945.

A. The London Non-Intervention Committee

A press report from Paris, dated July 23, 1936, indicated that Premier Leon Blum and Foreign Minister Yvon von Delbos were quite willing to consider favorably proposals for aid to the constitutional government in Spain.¹ About one week later, however, after the French Cabinet had been persuaded to forbid all arms shipments to Spain in the name of "peace" and "non-intervention"², official Paris decided to appeal to the British and Italian Governments for "the rapid adoption and rigid observance of an agreed arrangement for non-

1. See p.101.2. Schuman, op. cit., p. 596.

intervention" in the Spanish conflict, and on August 1, Premier Blum took the initiative¹ for a non-intervention agreement. Three days later, Great Britain officially accepted the proposal, and on August 15, Britain and France formally imposed an arms embargo against Spain.

In spite of information which indicated that the totalitarian states of the Right had violated the Non-Intervention Agreement and taken direct action in the Spanish Civil War during July and August, Blum declared on September 6:

"There is not a single piece of circumstantial evidence to show that the non-intervention agreement has been violated. . . . But should we undertake a competition of armaments on Spanish soil? . . . If certain Powers furnish arms and planes to the Rebels, should France furnish them to the Popular Front? . . . No. . . ."²

After some five weeks of negotiations, the Non-Intervention Committee held its first meeting in the British capital on September 9. This initial conference, attended by delegates from 26 nations, proved to be an almost complete failure due to the surly mood of the Fascist powers and the absence of Portugal, which didn't send a representative to London until the meeting of September 28.³

H. M. Brailsford, in discussing the oddity of the new "neutrality" agreement, said in September 1936:

". . . Never before in the diplomatic history of Europe has any government been debarred from buying abroad the arms it required to maintain in-

1. See p. 102 for alleged origin of non-intervention agreement.

2. Schuman, op. cit., p. 596.

3. Foreign Affairs, January 1937, p. 269.

ternal peace. This new doctrine of spurious neutrality placed this government sprung as it is from a recent and decisive election, on a footing of equality with insurgent soldiers who lack both legal authority and popular support. . . 'We agree to boycott the police, if you will stop helping the gangsters'--such are the social ethics of this doctrine of neutrality."¹

In the opinion of Frederick L. Schuman, the non-intervention of the Western Democracies was, in fact, intervention on behalf of the Rebels. This authority on international affairs says:

"The 'non-intervention' agreement was, by implication, a recognition of the belligerency of the rebels, though this was later denied by the British Government. Here, paradoxically, neutrality was unneutral in its practical effects and non-intervention was an act of intervention, both in law and fact, since the signatories denied to Madrid its customary right to purchase arms to suppress rebellion and thus aided the insurgents. Germany, Italy, and Portugal, though parties to the Agreement, surreptitiously sent war materials to the rebels. . . ."²

Portugal severed diplomatic relations with Madrid on October 23, 1936,³ the same day that Russia declared that, since Portugal, Germany, and Italy were supplying the Rebels with arms, she felt herself no longer bound to the Spanish Non-Intervention Agreement to any extent greater than the remaining participants in the conflict.⁴

Five days later, when Portugal threatened to scrap the agreement on Spain, the London Committee completely exon-

1. The New Republic, September 23, 1936, pp. 174-176.

2. Ibid., p. 133.

3. New York Times, October 24, 1936, p. 1.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

erated Italy and Portugal on the grounds that Soviet charges either had not been proved or had referred to actions which preceded the adoption of the accord on non-intervention. At this time Foreign Minister Eden denied that non-intervention had aided the Insurgents, and, despite the detailed evidence of violations of the Non-Intervention Agreement offered by neutral observers in Lisbon, asserted that neither His Majesty's Government nor the London Committee had any information to support the Soviet charges against Portugal.¹

However, alarming reports of foreign "volunteers" arriving on the Spanish scene, together with the premature recognition of the Franco regime by Germany and Italy on November 18, finally disturbed the complacency of the Committee and, on December 4, Great Britain demanded that a thorough study be made of the "volunteer" problem. At the same time, France acted with Britain in asking that the other powers cooperate in the establishment of a control system about the frontiers of Spain.²

When an arms control plan was finally devised by the Non-Intervention Committee, the Loyalist Government, on February 2, 1937, announced its acceptance of the scheme in principle but at the same time reserved the right to buy munitions where it could.³

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, November 6, 1936.

2. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1938, p. 67.

3. New York Times, February 3, 1937, p. 5.

Although a committee of the League of Nations Council had issued, on October 2, 1937, a resolution warning the Fascist and Nazi supporters of the Spanish Rebels that unless an agreement were soon arrived at concerning the withdrawal of volunteers from the Iberian Peninsula, League members of the London Committee would consider ending the policy of non-intervention,¹ the text of the Non-Intervention Committee's proposal for the withdrawal of "volunteers" from Spain was not published until July 11, 1938. Fifteen days later, the Loyalist regime agreed to accept the plan, but requested that, in the future, all the major ports of the country be controlled and that foreign naval patrols cover all of the Spanish coast line.²

General Franco, however, would not agree to the London scheme which proposed a proportionate reduction of "volunteers" from each side. The Insurgent leader was quite willing to accept the proposal provided that 10,000 "volunteers" be withdrawn from both the Rebel and the Republican forces. This arrangement would have reduced the number of foreign troops aiding Franco to 30,000 but would have deprived the Loyalists of all their outside help.³

After more than two and one-half years of enforcing a one-way neutrality, the plan to guarantee non-intervention

1. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1938, p. 69.

2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, August 12, 1938.

3. Foreign Policy Bulletin, August 26, 1938.

finally collapsed on March 22, 1939, when Germany and Italy refused to pay their long-overdue contributions.¹

B. The League of Nations

The Spanish Civil War gave the League of Nations, just as it gave Great Britain and France, a last opportunity to regain its prestige and authority which had been steadily waning since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the Italian conquest and annexation of Ethiopia in 1935-1936.

By including Articles 6, 7, and 77 in the Constitution of 1931, the Spanish Republic had proved herself to be one of the staunchest supporters of the League of Nations. In Article 6, Spain renounced war as an instrument of national policy; in Article 7, the Republic bound itself to respect the universal rules of international law, incorporating them into its positive law; and in Article 77, the Constitution prohibited the President from signing a declaration of war except when subject to the conditions prescribed in the Covenant of the League, and then only after all peaceful means of procedure had been exhausted.²

What obligations, if any, the League of Nations would have to fulfill under its Covenant was one of the most controversial of subjects in international affairs during the first few months of the Spanish conflict. Francis O. Wilcox pointed

1. New York Times, March 23, 1939, p. 13.

2. Current History, "Text of the Spanish Constitution," June 1932, pp. 374-384. Also Annals, July 1938, pp. 65-66.

out that, under Article 10 of the Covenant, the League insured the state against external aggression only and did not insure the state against internal political disturbances, while under Article 15, it was ruled that disputes arising from matters solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state were excluded from the competence of the League Council.¹

But, where did an internal affair cease to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction and become international in scope? The League was faced with this dilemma. As a rebellion, the Spanish Civil War was not a subject coming within the range of the League's jurisdiction. However, in that the conflict was an internal disturbance which threatened to produce complications of an international character endangering world peace, the struggle in Spain was of the utmost concern to the League.²

On November 18, 1936, the Italian and German Governments recognized the regime of General Franco, ostensibly on the grounds that the Insurgents were in possession of the greater part of Spain, and that chaos reigned in the territory controlled by the Loyalists.³ Nine days later, the Spanish Republic invoked Article 11 of the League Covenant, and asked the Secretary-General to convene a special session of the League Council.⁴ The premature recognition of the Insurgents by the Fascist States, together with the Italian and German

1. Annals, July 1938, p. 66.

2. Ibid., p. 66.

3. Foreign Affairs, January 1937, p. 274.

4. Foreign Policy Bulletin, December 4, 1936.

naval attacks along the Spanish coast seemed sufficient to the Loyalists to be considered as a "circumstance affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."¹ Wilcox maintains that the Republic could just as easily have invoked Articles 15, 16, and 17, which involved the League sanction system, but that friends of Spain persuaded the Republic's delegate that a strict application of the Covenant would be impossible.²

Clarence K. Streit, discussing the complexities of the Spanish question as it confronted the League, said in December 1936:

"Since the Council must thus start by re-affirming that Valencia is the legitimate government of Spain, it wonders how it can deny Valencia's plea that it is an unfriendly act for Germany and Italy to aid the Rebels. To answer that Russia is aiding Valencia is no answer, for no government can formally agree that it would be an unfriendly act for one government to aid in suppressing rebellion and a friendly act for another government to aid the rebels in overthrowing it. . . . The fact that the Spanish Government has law on its side cannot easily be dismissed as pure legalism. It raises instead a still broader dilemma--if the League is not going to favor the legal side, on what basis can it operate and what is the use for any country to strive to keep a good legal record if nothing is gained thereby?"³

After the Republic had refrained from placing the Civil War on the agenda of the 1936 Assembly, her representa-

1. Annals, July 1938, pp. 66-67.

2. Ibid., p. 67.

3. New York Times, December 6, 1936, p. E 6.

tive at Geneva formally placed the question before the League Council in December 1936, where it was for the time being conveniently pigeon-holed.¹ On December 12, after Britain and France had taken the initiative in preparing for the establishment of an arms control plan for Spain, the League Council passed a resolution which made a feeble attempt at reprimanding the Fascist Powers for their intervention in the conflict.²

The Spanish conflict was placed before the League Council again in May 1937, when J. Alvarez del Vayo submitted a White Book on "Italian Aggression," including 101 facsimilies of all kinds of documents chosen from 2,000 of them supposed to have been captured from Italian troops. According to the evidence presented by the Spanish delegate, several of the orders were marked "secret and most urgent," and had been sent from the Ministry of War in Rome to units of the Italian Army in Spain.³

Anne O'Hare McCormick, in remarking on the fact that only one of the 101 documents referred to German aggression and that this document was omitted from the summary released to the press, declared:

"The whole procedure smacks of a political manoeuvre for ends beyond the immediate object of accusing the interventionists and forcing their withdrawal from Spain. The Spanish delegate must have had the acquiescence if not the support of Britain and France in what looks like a move to placate Berlin and bear down on Rome. This may be

1. Annals, July 1938, p. 67.

2. Ibid.

3. New York Times, May 28, 1937, p. 1.

good strategy for a desirable end, but it is the kind of strategy that confirms critics who say that the powers have used the League for their own purposes. It explains what has happened at Geneva."¹

In September 1937, Dr. Koth, the Norwegian Foreign Secretary offered a proposal to the League Assembly which involved the League's inviting the two belligerents to agree to an armistice. When hostilities would be suspended, according to this plan, a referendum would be taken under League auspices to settle the form of government in Spain. This proposal met with absolutely no support.²

De Madariaga says that the "spirited" resolution which was presented on October 2, 1937 to the League Assembly by a committee of the Council, declaring that non-intervention would be abandoned as the League policy toward the Spanish Civil War unless all nations respected their obligations under it, was readily accepted by all League members, but believed in by none.³

On September 20, the League Assembly, by a vote of 24 to 23, refused to re-elect Spain to her semi-permanent seat in the Council, with a bloc of pro-Franco Latin American nations swinging the vote against Valencia, the new seat of the Loyalist Government.⁴

When the Spanish Republic's representative introduced

1. New York Times, May 29, 1937, p. 16.

2. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 409.

3. Ibid., p. 399.

4. New York Times, September 21, 1937, p. 13.

a resolution before the League Council, requesting that League members carry out their pledge of October 2, 1937 to consider the termination of non-intervention if "volunteers" were not withdrawn from Spain, the proposal was rejected by the Council, acting under the orders of Great Britain, by a vote of four to two, with nine abstentions.¹

On January 16, 1939, the representative from Iran, president of the committee of three which supervised the evacuation of foreign combatants from Republican Spain, reported to the Council on the withdrawal of Loyalist supporters. In reporting on the many high-sounding speeches of praise and appreciation addressed to Spanish Foreign Minister del Vayo, Arnaldo Cortesi declared:

"In the general rush of congratulation, however, all but the French and New Zealand delegates forgot to mention the justice of the demands that withdrawal of foreigners from the Republican side be matched by a corresponding withdrawal of foreigners from the other side. . . . Viscount Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, skimmed over this point lightly with the general statement that it was necessary to put a halt to foreign intervention."²

Thus did the League of Nations, like Great Britain, like France, and like the Non-Intervention Committee, play out the false string of one-way neutrality to the bitter end. In allowing itself to be forced into the role of an accessory to the death of the Spanish Republic, the League of Nations dug its own grave.

1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, May 20, 1938.

2. New York Times, January 17, 1939, p. 11.

C. International Law and the Civil War

From an international viewpoint, the most important legal issues raised by the Spanish conflict concerned recognition of a state of belligerency, recognition of a de facto government, and neutrality and neutral duties.

In the sense that they are internal conflicts between different factions struggling to gain control of the government of the same country, civil wars are questions of a domestic nature and do not come within the jurisdiction of international law.

Nevertheless, in 1820, since there was no international rule which gave foreign powers the right to intervene in civil strifes of a purely domestic nature, the members of the Quadruple Alliance, at the Congress of Troppau, pledged themselves to intervene, with armed force if necessary, to assist any legitimate government which was threatened with revolutionary liberal movements. The activities of members of this Alliance in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain, which followed the conclusion of the Troppau Protocol, established a precedent for foreign intervention in the internal affairs of a nation torn by civil disturbances.

Charles G. Fenwick, in comparing the situation in Spain during the Civil War with that which confronted the Quadruple Alliance in 1820, declared:

"What we have been witnessing in Spain for the past two years is in a broad way a reversal of the earlier revolt of liberalism against monarchical legitimacy. For this time it is the

conservative groups that are the rebels; it is the army and the propertied interests that are questioning the authority of the de jure government; and in their challenge to the constitutional regime they are receiving the support of clericals who have normally been on the side of established order. . . . The practical failure of collective non-intervention is paralleled by its inherently immoral evasion of community responsibility. . . . It may doubtless be taken as a starting point that the government in power under the constitution of the state should have a prima facie claim to the support of the community of nations in any procedure of mediation. . . ."¹

Although almost from the beginning of the rebellion, General Franco repeatedly sought to obtain the status of a belligerent, such recognition was constantly denied him by all of the members of the community of nations, with the exception of Germany, Italy, and a few other smaller powers. But throughout the Civil War, the Western Democracies and the Non-Intervention Committee, while persistently refusing to recognize the belligerency of the Spanish Insurgents, attempted to enforce a policy of strict neutrality toward Spain. Yet, according to Philip C. Jessup and Charles G. Burlingham, when there is no belligerency there is no neutrality, and when there is no neutrality there is no neutral duty or neutrality policy.²

Herbert Wright, Professor of International Law at Catholic University of America, took the view that when the belligerency of an insurgency has been recognized by the legitimate government, a foreign state is free to withhold or grant

1. American Journal of International Law, vol. 52, 1958, pp. 539-540.

2. New York Times, January 31, 1939, p. 2.

the same recognition, and that if the foreign power withholds such recognition, it is bound by international law to abstain from aiding the Rebels, while remaining free to grant or refrain from granting assistance to the de jure government. If a foreign nation recognizes the belligerency of the forces of rebellion but does not desire to enter the conflict on either side, it is bound by international law to abstain from helping either belligerent.¹

When he mentions the recognition of the belligerency of an insurgency within a state by the legitimate government of that state, Professor Wright would seem to be confusing terms. The recognition of a condition of insurgency is quite different from the recognition of a condition of belligerency.

Upon receiving the status of a belligerent, an insurgent regime is recognized as possessing the same rights under international law as those granted to a sovereign state when it is at war. A recognized belligerent may establish a blockade, search ships of third powers on the high seas, and seize and confiscate goods.² No legitimate government grants the status of a belligerent to Rebels seeking to destroy its constitutional authority. The Spanish Government did not recognize that a condition of belligerency existed. It did recognize that a condition of insurgency existed. In drawing a fine distinction between a state of insurgency and a state of bel-

1. New York Times, April 10, 1938, p. E 8.

2. Foreign Affairs, January 1937, p. 272.

ligerency, Philip C. Jessup quotes from page 82, volume I of Charles C. Hyde's International Law as follows:

"Recognition of a condition of insurgency in a foreign country is merely a reckoning with a state of facts. It confers no special rights on the insurgents; it manifests no design to aid them; it affords no ground of complaint to the parent State; it imposes on the foreign State none of the burdens of a neutral."¹

Italy and Germany not only recognized the belligerency of General Franco, but on November 13, 1936, recognized the Insurgent regime as the de facto government of Spain. This premature recognition of the Rebels was definitely, in the opinion of Schuman, a violation of the rights of the constitutional government.² Yet, Professor Wright argued that both the Soviet Union and France, in not recognizing the belligerency of the Insurgents, and the Fascist Powers in not only recognizing the belligerency of the Franco regime but also considering it as the de facto government of the country, were within their rights under international law.³

Jessup maintains that although international law does not impose upon states a duty to recognize new governments at any particular moment, it does brand as an illegal intervention in the domestic affairs of another state a premature recognition accorded to Rebels with the intent of aiding them to overthrow the established government.⁴ Of the complications

1. Foreign Affairs, January 1937, p. 270.

2. Ibid., p. 107.

3. New York Times, April 10, 1938, p. E 8.

4. Foreign Affairs, January 1937, p. 279.

which arose as a result of the action taken by the Fascist States on November 18, this authority on international law said:

"The consequence of the extension or recognition by Italy and Germany is that thereafter for them the Franco government is the government of Spain and the established government is merely a rebellious group. In other words, the tables are completely turned. . . . Italy and Germany would now be legally free to supply aid to the Franco group just as previously any states would have been free to supply aid to the established government. . . . If the Non-Intervention Agreement were terminated, Italy and Germany might be found officially helping the Franco government which they recognize, while France and Russia might officially help the established government which they recognize. Both groups of Powers would assert that they were merely helping the Government of Spain to suppress a rebellion."¹

The problems in international law created by the Spanish civil strife will be considered further in that chapter of Part II which has been devoted to a discussion of the legality of our neutrality policy toward the Civil War.

1. Foreign Affairs, January 1937, p. 274.

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